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IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?
ABSTRACT
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) owes much of its appeal to its image
as a neutral principle for deciding upon the appropriate stringency of
environmental, health, and safety regulation. This article examines whether
CBA is neutral in effect, i.e. whether it sometimes makes regulations more
stringent or regularly leads to weaker health, safety and environmental
protection. It also addresses the question of whether CBA offers either an
objective value-neutral method or procedural neutrality.
This Article shows that CBA has almost always proven antienvironmental in practice and that, in many ways, it is anti-environmental
in theory. It examines the practice of the Bush Administration using a
representative data set and shows that Office of Management and Budget
review produced numerous anti-environmental, health, and safety changes
and no pro-protection changes in the rules in the data set. It also reviews
“prompt letters,” which CBA proponents cite as examples of CBA
producing more regulation, rather than less. These letters have never
prompted any fresh regulatory action and rarely have any basis in CBA.
Finally, this article shows that the anecdotal information relied upon to
show that CBA sometimes has strengthened rules prior to the Bush
Administration provides little or no support for the view that CBA has a
neutral effect.
The most common legal formulation of a cost-benefit test, that the
costs should not exceed the benefits of regulation, acts a one-way ratchet,
demanding that some regulations become less stringent, but never
demanding greater protection of health, safety, or the environment.
Nevertheless, one can discern some reasons why some analysts look at
CBA as neutral in the apparent even-handedness of the optimality criterion,
which has more influence in the academy than in practice. Even this
criterion, however, does not act neutrally relative to all existing alternative
criteria. Furthermore, the value choices in choosing methods for
quantifying benefits make objective value neutral CBA a theoretical
impossibility.
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IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?
INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists generally oppose cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
and regulated industry generally supports it.1 Both sides have attorneys
with extensive experience lobbying for regulatory outcomes favoring their
constituents’ interests and know a great deal about the process of
regulation. Therefore, their juxtaposed positions on regulatory CBA
provide powerful evidence that CBA favors industry and disfavors health,
safety, and environmental protection.
Nevertheless, University of Chicago Law Professor Cass Sunstein
writes that CBA “is for everyone.”2 He portrays CBA as sometimes
making regulation more stringent and sometimes making it less stringent,
suggesting that its net effect might be neutral.3 The position that CBA
constitutes a neutral reform has great intuitive appeal. Many academics
and policy-makers may find CBA attractive precisely because of its
apparent even-handedness.4 Indeed, CBA seems to offer precisely what

1

THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 149-150 (1991) (“regulatees” support CBA, but
“regulatory beneficiaries uniformly oppose it.”). See Barton H. Thompson, What Good is
Economics, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 179 (2003) (“opponents of government regulation”
have been CBA’s “principal proponents”); Robert Perks et al., REWRITING THE RULES:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S ASSAULT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 24 (2002) (the Natural
Resources Defense Council claims that the Office of Management and Budget “is using
biased cost-benefit analysis . . . to block meaningful environmental proposals.”); Zygmunt
J. B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting
Market Force Dynamics, 23 BOST. COLL. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 733, 747 (1996) (CBA has
been a “tactical favorite” of anti-regulatory lobbyists).
2

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 137 (2002).

3

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L. J. 2255, 2265
(2002) (supporting statement that “people with diverse views” should support CBA with
examples of CBA producing “more rapid and stringent regulation”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 26-27 (2002) (citing examples
of CBA causing “more rapid and stringent regulation.”).
4

See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35 (2004) (“cost-benefit analysis presents
itself as the soul of rationality, an impartial, objective standard for making good
decisions.”). See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, Bush Nominates Utah Governor to Lead
Environmental Agency: Industry Pleased; Conservationists’ Views Mixed, N.Y. TIMES A1
(August 12, 2003) (Mike Leavitt, Bush’s nominee to head EPA, has an environmental
philosophy “based on balance”).
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lawyers usually expect a neutral procedure to provide: full consideration
of both sides of a case. Perhaps we should regard CBA as a neutral
principle, because it look like a neutral decision-making procedure.5 The
idea of neutral principles in constitutional law has proven extremely
attractive to many legal scholars, so the notion that CBA is neutral may
explain some of its intuitive appeal to many academics.6
Yet, CBA poses a paradox. On the one hand, CBA appears
obviously even-handed. On the other hand, the positions of advocates with
decades of regulatory experience suggest it is not. This article tries to
resolve this paradox and answer the question of whether greater use of
CBA constitutes a neutral reform.
Much hinges upon the outcome of this debate. CBA has gained
ground over the years, aided by vigorous advocacy from industry, industryfunded conservative think tanks, and academics, including some, like
Professor Sunstein, who honestly view CBA as a neutral rationalizing
reform.7 Its future progress may hinge upon whether politicians, voters,
and even perhaps, academics, perceive it as a neutral reform, or as a reform
serving regulated parties at the expense of the public beneficiaries of
environmental, health, and safety protection.8 And both its opponents and
supporters agree that CBA’s fate will significantly influence the future of
environmental, health, and safety regulation.9
This article will examine CBA’s neutrality historically, doctrinally,
and theoretically. For the most part, this Article focuses upon neutrality as
advocates of CBA implicitly define it. Their idea that CBA sometimes
makes environmental, health, and safety protections more stringent and
5

See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L. J. 165, 195 (1999) (describing CBA as a “decision procedure.”)
6
See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959). See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2000) (selling cost-benefit analysis by referring repeatedly to
“a neutral economist’s benefit-cost test”) [emphasis added].
7

See, e.g., Sunstein, note 2, at 6-7 (characterizing CBA as a device to spur “obviously”
undesirable regulations while deterring obviously desirable regulations).
8

See William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative
Mirage” of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. J. 298, 348-49 (1996)
(while regulatory reform proponents assume that agencies “produce excessive regulation,”
they “spoke of the need for better . . . regulation.”)
9
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 4, at 35 (CBA has “become a powerful
weapon” for opposing regulation); SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 3 (increased cost-benefit
balancing involves a “dramatic shift” in regulation).
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sometimes less stringent suggests that CBA has a neutral effect. Analysis
of CBA’s effect requires comparison of a regulation as influenced by CBA
with some baseline, an agency proposal arrived at using some other
statutory criteria and analysis. For example, many environmental rules
coming from EPA reflect some EPA judgment about what reductions or
feasible with existing technology.10 Proposals based on a feasibility
principle are unlikely to be draconian, because they reflect consideration
of cost and a preference for avoiding plant shutdowns.11 This article will
compare the effect of a proposal under existing statutory criterion to
changes reflecting application of CBA to evaluate the issue of neutral
effect.
Regulatory reformers’ claim that CBA has a largely neutral effect
in this sense is an essential element of their case for it. For the law
professors supporting regulatory reform have never argued that
environmental regulation is too stringent across the board. Rather, they
have used data showing uneven expenditures of dollars spent per life saved
to argue that some regulation needs strengthening and some needs
weakening, so that greater consistency can arise.12 They characterize the
needed reform, not as weakening environmental protection, but as
improving priority setting.13 If CBA only makes regulation weaker, and
never strengthens overly weak regulation, it cannot improve priority setting
and consistency in the manner its proponents envision. This Article will
also examine the idea of CBA as a value neutral and therefore objective
exercise. Finally, this Article will look at CBA as a form of procedural

10

See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental law, 37

STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334-35 (1985) (characterizing the existing system as based primarily

upon requiring the best available technology).
11

See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32
B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 9-16 (2005) (explaining how the feasibility principle constrains
stringency).
12

See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments,
and the Cost Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 257-260 (1996) (discussing the need to
reallocate resources to reduce inconsistency and misallocation of resources); STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10-23
(1993) (same).
13

See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 257-260 (citing the need for better priority setting
as the first lesson learned from regulation since the New Deal). For a critique of this view,
see David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory
Reform Debate, 31 ENVT'L L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10003(2001).
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neutrality, offering a neutral procedure for developing regulation analogous
to a hearing.14
Part one will explain what CBA is and its place in environmental
law. Part two examines the neutrality question as a matter of historical fact.
It asks whether CBA has, in the past, been used to weaken regulation, to
make it more stringent, or to do some of both. It adds to the existing
literature in two ways. First, it offers a detailed analysis of the anecdotes
that support academic claims that CBA has sometimes made regulation
more stringent or extensive. Second, it presents a new empirical analysis
of the George W. Bush administration’s use of CBA. Part three addresses
the neutrality issue as a doctrinal and theoretical question. It asks whether
CBA is neutral in theory.
Part four briefly elucidates the implications of the data and analysis
for the regulatory reform debate. But this article does not attempt to settle
the question of CBA’s value. It has the more modest aim of addressing the
question of CBA’s neutrality. The neutrality question and the data
collected here to address it does, however, have important implications for
the general reform debate.
I. CBA AND ITS HISTORY
This part provides some basic background regarding CBA and its
use in regulation. It defines CBA and then provides a basic history of its
place in modern environmental, health, and safety law.
A. CBA: A Definition
CBA of a proposed regulation consists of estimates of the
regulation’s costs and of the monetary value economists associate with the
harms the regulation will avoid, which the literature commonly refers to as
benefits.15 CBA contemplates quantification of the averted harms,

14

I do not claim that these ideas exhaust the possible concepts of neutrality that might
be used to defend CBA. A subsequent article will address some other concepts and the
question of whether neutrality is desirable in this context.
15

See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 560-61 & n. 67 (1997)
(distinguishing harm avoidance from benefit creation). Cf. Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities
of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97,101 (1987)
(comparing CBA in the narrow sense that I use, with a broader definition of CBA).
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including deaths, illness, and ecological destruction, in dollar terms.16 CBA
advocates claim that this is often possible, but concede that regulators
cannot quantify many relevant environmental and health effects.17
To estimate the cost of a regulation for purposes of CBA, the
analyst must engage in the same technique regulators use to develop
technology-based regulations. Since the cost of making any reduction in
pollution or improvement in safety equals the cost of making the
technological change that will accomplish the improvement, cost analysis
in both contexts requires the assessment of the capabilities and cost of
technology.18 Market data generally enables regulators to estimate the
direct cost of the technological improvements they envision.19 These
estimates, however,
usually prove too high.20
The assessment of the benefits associated with a discrete pollution
reduction or safety improvement, however, is much more problematic.21
16

William H. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and
Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 193 (1980) (defining CBA
as a comparison between costs and benefits in dollar terms).
17

See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 13 (2004) [hereinafter OMB 2004] (many of the
major rules OMB has reviewed in the last 10 years “have important non-quantified”
benefits and costs); SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 12 (“quantification will be . . . impossible
in some cases.”).
18

See Driesen, supra note 11, at 49-50.

19

Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health Safety and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2009 (2002). This process, however, is
not as simple as it might appear. See id.
20

See id. at 1998 (ex ante cost estimates have been higher than actual costs incurred,
sometimes by orders of magnitude); Winston.Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and
Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS AND
MANAGEMENT 297 (2000). Cf. OMB 2004, supra note 17, at 50-53 (claiming that some
studies find that indirect cost exceed the estimated costs, which are often limited to direct
costs).
21

Compare McGarity and Ruttenberg, supra note 19, at 2055 (for some add-on control
technologies, cost estimates are accurate within 30%, which is a good deal more accurate
than benefits assessment); with Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin. L.
Rev. 7, 53 (1998) (risk estimates can vary by five to ten orders of magnitude). See also
Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.145 (2003) (arguing that some environmental problems
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This assessment requires two extraordinarily difficult steps, first a
quantitative risk assessment and then monetization of the benefits
described.22 Quantitative risk assessment has proven quite daunting,
because data gaps make estimating the number of illnesses, deaths, and
ecological disturbances a particular regulation will avoid impossible for
most health effects and nearly all ecological effects.23 When agencies can
estimate the magnitude of some health effects, that estimation usually
requires a lot of guesswork in order to extrapolate estimates of a discrete
regulation’s impact on human health from data that often comes from

may conform to “power laws” that make catastrophic outcomes likely enough to justify a
precautionary approach). In practice, agencies often resort to default assumptions and
expert judgment to arrive at numerical estimates. OFFICE OF THE SCIENCE ADVISOR STAFF
PAPER, RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES (EPA/100/B-04/001) 11 (2004)
[hereinafter, EPA STAFF PAPER). While such default assumptions sometimes allow an
analysis in the face of data gaps and uncertainties, id. at 11, 13, they do not so much
eliminate uncertainties in the underlying data as hide them, see id. at 13, 52 (default
assumptions require science policy positions or choices). See generally Rodgers, supra
note 16, at 197 (quantification can reduce the quality of information supplied to the
decisionmaker). In principle, revelation of the reasons for the default assumptions and the
uncertainties that they purport to resolve can aid transparency. EPA STAFF PAPER, supra
at 52. But, in practice, top level decision-makers often focus on the simple numbers and
pay little attention to grasping the full range of uncertainty. See Rodgers, supra note 16,
at 198 (often decisionmakers do not fully understand the methodology’s limitations and
biases). Indeed, one of the functions of quantitative risk assessment involves substituting
numbers for a messy qualitative description of facts. Some commentators see hope in
mathematical techniques to quantify the probabilities of various outcomes in the fact of
uncertainty. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Against Individual Risk: A Sympathetic Critique
of Risk Assessment, U. of Penn. Inst. for Law and Economics Research Paper 04-01 (2004).
But EPA has cautioned that such assessments do not offer panaceas, because they often
consume huge resources, only occasionally add value to the decision-making process, and
will only prove as accurate as the data underlying them. EPA Staff Paper, at 35, 41, 49.
In light of this, EPA cautions that “full probabilistic models of cancer risk” are not yet
generally feasible. Id. at 49.
22

See McGarity, supra note 21, at 12 (CBA in the health and environmental context
begins with quantitative risk assessment).
23

See, e.g., OMB 2004, supra note 17, at 18 (2004) (discussing major benefits that
were not quantified from reducing water pollution from animal feeding operations);
Richard W. Parker, Grading Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1382, 1389-1400
(2003) (explaining the difficulties with non-cancer health effects and ecological effects and
giving numerous examples of failure to count non-quantifiable benefits).
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laboratory tests on other species or from human experience with much
larger doses than those that the rules under consideration address.24
Assigning monetary values to avoided illness, death, and
environmental damage raises ethical questions and serious technical
problems. Monetization requires very controversial value assumptions and
in many cases proves impossible.25
The typical outcome of CBA includes a dollar value for expected
costs and a wide range of dollar values for a few quantifiable benefits. This
range often proves so large that it deprives CBA of any capacity it might
have to objectively guide decision-making.26 But many important
environmental, health, and safety effects cannot be quantified at all, so
CBA of environmental, health, and safety decisions typically includes a

24
EPA Staff Paper, supra note 21, at 56 (noting EPA’s dependence upon animal data
and data from very high concentrations of short duration); Robert W. Hahn & John A.
Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233,
236 (1990) (because of the imprecision of tools for estimating regulatory impacts, most
estimates are properly viewed as “guesstimates”). See Parker, supra note 23, at 1411
(pointing out that the range of uncertainty frequently would “vitiate the relevance of
numerical ranges”); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and
Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN L. REV.
103, 120-92 (2001) (describing in detail the data gaps and assumptions needed to assess
food-related risks); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (1995) (discussing the problem of extrapolating human health
effects from high dose animal experiments); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-T:
The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L. J. 403, 415 (1994)
(describing the process of deriving risk assessments for human beings from animal studies
as involving “more guesswork than a television game show”); Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 562, 572 (1992) (the National Academy of Sciences has identified 50
“inference options,” where a policy decision must be made to extrapolate a risk assessment
from limited data); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729, 732-33 n. 21 (discussing
the data and uncertainties underlying regulation of vinyl chloride).
25

See Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the
Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 129, 180183 (2004) (providing examples of cases where monetization of benefits proved
impossible); Parker, supra note 23, at 1388, 1391-98 (discussing unquantified benefits in
various rules). In addition, any uncertainties in the monetization will be multiplied by the
uncertainty in the risk assessment, thus making the end result even more problematic.
26

See Sunstein, Arithmetic, supra note 3, at 2257 (finding that a “benefits range”
sometimes proves so “exceedingly wide” that it does little to “discipline judgment”).
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long list of benefits that could not be quantified, many of which are
significant in the view of experts in the area.27
Regulatory reformers expect CBA to influence regulatory outcomes.
In particular, CBA may influence decisions about how stringent a standard
a government agency should adopt. CBA proponents sometimes articulate
what I call the “indeterminate position,” that regulators should consider
CBA.28 This position does not tell us how regulators should respond to
CBA.29 But sometimes regulatory reformers favor a cost-benefit criterion,
such as the position that the costs of regulation generally should not exceed
the estimated benefits.30 A criterion does tell us something about how CBA
should affect regulatory decisions. This distinction between the
“indeterminate position” and various cost-benefit criteria will help organize
the discussion of CBA’s use and will also prove important to the theoretical
analysis of CBA’s neutrality in part three.

27

See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L. J.
2341, 2351-52 (2002) (discussing serious health effects associated with arsenic that EPA
could not quantify); Sunstein, Arithmetic, supra note 3, at 2274 (same)
28

See Driesen, supra note 11, at 48 (explaining why a requirement to consider CBA
is indeterminate). See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order
for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 PENN.
L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002) (CBA is a tool and a procedure not a rigid formula to determine
outcomes); Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 195 (describing CBA as a “decision
procedure” not as a criterion).
29

See Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that requirement that agency consider costs and benefits did not yield any particular test);
Driesen, supra note 11, at 48.
30

Cf. Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1498 (arguing for a presumption against
regulation with costs exceeding benefits).
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B. CBA’s Use in Modern Environmental, Health and Safety Law
Most modern environmental, health, and safety statutes aim to
protect public health and the environment.31 Many of these statutes seek
to accomplish this through a combination of health-based (or, more
broadly, effects-based) standards and technology-based standards.32
Health-based standard setting provisions require regulators to set pollution
levels that protect public health or the environment.33 Technology-based
regulations require regulators to match pollution levels to the capabilities
of technologies that can reduce pollution.34 A few of the health-based
standard setting provisions forbid the consideration of cost, and the others
relegate cost to a distinctly subsidiary role.35 The technology-based
provisions require the consideration of cost, but do not contemplate
balancing costs against monetized benefits. Instead, government agencies
sometimes examine costs to determine whether achievement of a proposed
standard is feasible, a process which only requires the comparison of costs
to the economic capabilities of facilities.36 Alternatively, (or as a

31

See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a),
7401(b)(1).
32

See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 327 (most statutes require examination of technological
capabilities, health impacts, or some combination of the two). See e.g., Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (EPA must establish national
ambient air quality standards to protect public health); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation
v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489-90 n. 13 (2004) (describing a requirement that polluters employ
the technology that “best reduces pollution within practical constraints”).
33

See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 456 (discussing the health-based provision
governing ambient air quality standards).
34

See, e.g., Alaska DEC, 540 U.S. at 489-90 n. 13.

35

See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 464-71 (EPA may not consider cost in setting national
ambient air quality standards to protect public health); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (EPA may not consider cost
in protecting health, but may consider it in providing an “ample margin” of safety from
hazardous air pollution).
36

See, e.g., Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, 540 U.S. 461, 496501 (2004); National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
(plant closures predicted when net earnings fall below the salvage value of a regulated
mill); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976) (CBA not required for
technology-based decisions under the Clean Water Act); Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445,
456 (4th Cir. 1985); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 836-37 (3rd Cir.
1978) (affirming the feasibility of a regulation imposing total costs of around $240 million,
because industry was profitable with producers earning more than $857 million a year);
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supplement) agencies implementing some technology-based provisions
agencies may engage in a rough form of balancing that does not involve
CBA, because it does not involve quantitative risk assessment or
monetization.37 This balancing relies upon marginal cost effectiveness
analysis.38 For an environmental regulation, the regulator estimates the
quantity of emission reductions available at a particular cost, generating
cost per ton of reduction estimates for various regulatory options.39 This
analysis helps the regulator to avoid extraordinarily costly requirements and
to create rules of thumb allowing for equitable treatment of the many
pollution sources contributing to an environmental problem.40 But it avoids
the complications inherent in quantifying and monetizing environmental
and health effects.41 Technology-based standard setting provisions require
consideration of cost, but do not impose a cost-benefit criterion or require
CBA, because they do not contemplate quantifying benefits to compare

National Renderers, 541 F.2d at 1289 (EPA erred in failing to compare costs to income to
measure economic viability); United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189,
1265 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (no matter how “initially frightening” the projected costs, a court
must examine those costs in “relation to the financial health and profitability of the
industry. . .”).
37
See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 37-39 (2003).
38

See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 41 (contrasting cost effectiveness analysis with CBA); Robert W. Hahn
et al., Empirical Analysis: Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agencies
to Comply with Executive Order 12866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 872-74 (2000)
(cost effectiveness analysis does not involve monetization of benefits); Fred Anderson et
al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVT’L. L. & POL. 89, 93 (2000-2001) (cost effectiveness
analysis is used instead of cost-benefit analysis for many applications in public health and
medicine).
39

See, e.g., Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (EPA
employed incremental cost effectiveness analysis in setting standards for marine engines);
Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204-07 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
avoidance of the knee in the curve is not required).
40

See MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining that EPA felt that it was “in the right
ballpark” in imposing costs of $11,654/ton of lead removal on small refineries, because its
standard for lead acid battery plants imposed $13,900 per ton removal costs for medium
plants and $5,080 per ton for large plants).
41

See Driesen, supra note 11, at 3.
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them to costs.42 This distinction between marginal cost effectiveness
analysis and CBA will prove important to the analysis of the history of
CBA’s use.43
The courts, however, have interpreted key statutory provisions in
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)44 and the Federal Insecticide
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)45 as mandating the application of
cost-benefit tests to government regulation.46 Congress recently added a
hybrid test that including a limited cost-benefit criterion to a third statute,
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).47 The history of the implementation
of TSCA and FIFRA, both of which make cost-benefit tests central,
provides an understanding of experience with cost-benefit criteria.

42

See Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980).

43
Cf. Anderson et al., supra note 38, at 93 (sometimes analysts use the term “costbenefit analysis” broadly to include both cost-benefit analysis itself and cost effectiveness
analysis). I distinguish between CBA and cost effectiveness analysis, because many
opponents of CBA, defined as a procedure that seeks to monetize benefits, do not oppose
cost effectiveness analysis. Also, marginal cost effectiveness analysis is not the same as
cost effectiveness analysis. Marginal cost effectiveness analysis can aid in choosing
among various goals (stringency levels) because it provides a ratio of costs to incremental
reductions in pollution. Cost effectiveness analysis evaluates the costs of different means
of achieving a pre-determined goal. See Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and CostEffectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L. J. 1067, 1069 (2003) (cost effectiveness analysis
compares different means of achieving the same regulatory end).
44

15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692.

45

7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.

46

See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District, 243 F.3d 256, 532 (9th Cir. 2001);
Save our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (proponent of a pesticide
must show that its benefits outweigh its risks); McGarity, Fuzzy Math, supra note 27, at
2343 (identifying cost-benefit balancing as the “core regulatory concept” of TSCA and
FIFRA); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 541-49 (1997) (critiquing the
interpretation of TSCA as imposing a cost-benefit test). Congress, however, amended
FIFRA in 1996 to modify the cost-benefit balancing approach for pesticides used in food.
See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 (codified
in scattered section of 7 U.S.C.).
47

Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25 (Supp. V 1999)). See McGarity, supra
note 27, at 2343-44 (analyzing the cost-benefit and risk/risk amendments); Jason Scott
Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory CostBenefit Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1343, 1393 (2002) (explaining the SDWA’s hybrid
test).
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Agencies frequently conduct CBA even under statutes that impose
no cost-benefit criteria. President Reagan introduced this practice through
promulgation of an executive order requiring CBA “to the extent permitted
by law” and requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
review agency actions under the order.48 This order formed part of the
Reagan Administration’s active deregulatory program.49 The Reagan
executive order’s avowed purpose was decidedly non-neutral; it sought to
“reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations.”50 Unfortunately,
almost all changes reducing regulatory “burdens” also reduce protection of
safety, public health, and/or the environment. Nevertheless, subsequent
presidents, including President Clinton, have continued this program,
issuing a series of executive orders required agencies to quantify “benefits”
and compare them to harms whenever possible and legally permissible.
The Unfunded Mandates Act of 199551 codified these requirements to some
extent.
The OMB, which mostly employs economists, oversees
implementation of the executive order.52 The tension between the
economic efficiency ideals animating the executive orders and the
Unfunded Mandates Act on the one hand, and the health and environmental
protection goals of the statutes not calling for CBA on the other, has

48

Exec.Order 12,291, §§ 2, 3, 3 C.F.R. part 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
note (1988) [hereinafter E.O. 12,291].
49

See Alan Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1986) (characterizing Reagan’s
executive order as part of a program by the “Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief”
to make sure that regulation is only promulgated, it at all, as a last resort).
50

E.O. No. 12, 291 (preamble). The preamble also announces some more neutral
purposes, namely increasing agency accountability, providing Presidential oversight,
minimizing conflict and duplication, and insuring well reasoned regulation. Id.
Nevertheless, the existence of a goal of reducing burdens with no goal of increasing
benefits suggests a lack of neutrality. See Robert V. Percival, Rediscovering the Limits of
Regulatory Review Authority of the Office of Management and Budget, 17 ENVT’L L. REP.
(Envt’l L. Inst.) 10017, 10018 (1987) (an anti-regulatory philosophy inspired the Reagan
executive orders, rather than a “concern for improving the regulatory process.”)
51

Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532.

52

See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE
IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 3,
17-21 (2003) [hereinafter GAO 2003] (describing OMB’s review role in detail); Office of
Management and Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
Regulation, 67 Fed. Reg. 15014, 15021-22 (juxtaposing a few recent science hires with
“OIRA’s historical staffing strengths in economics, policy analysis, statistics and law.”)
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produced a history of negotiation between OMB and regulatory agencies
about the content of regulations.53 Experience under the executive orders
outside the FIFRA and TSCA context offers an understanding of the history
of the indeterminate position’s application.54
Thus, we have two sorts of history to examine. The history of
application of cost-benefit criteria comes primarily from TSCA and FIFRA.
The history of the results of an indeterminate position come primarily from
examination of OMB supervision of agency administration of the other
health, safety, and environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act
(CAA),55 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),56 the

53
See Kathleen O’Connor, Comment, OMB Involvement in FDA Regulations:
Regulating the Regulators, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 175, 195-206 (1988) (describing in detail
the protracted negotiation between OMB and the Food and Drug Administration over a rule
governing investigation new drug applications); Kargman, Note, OMB Intervention in
Agency Rulemaking: the Case for Broadened Record Review, 95 YALE L. J. 1789, 1791-93
(1986) (referring to two records in administrative rulemaking under the executive orders,
one of the agencies interactions with the public and one of its interactions with OMB).
54

See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 329-342 (explaining how combining CBA with existing
statutory criterion leads to an indeterminate “muddle”). One might object to this
conclusion on the grounds that the executive orders contain some criteria to govern
regulation. But these criteria may only govern, under the executive orders’ terms, to the
extent permissible by law. See E.O. 12291, §§ 2, 3(a), 6(a), 7(e); Exec. Order 12498, § 4,
3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1988). This invites a debate about
whether the existing law permits these criteria to govern or makes them irrelevant. In
practice, the juxtaposition of conflicting criteria often lead to ad hoc negotiation between
OMB and implementing agencies. Certainly, conflicting criteria can make the governing
law “indeterminate.” Cf. Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV.
965, 967-68 (1997) (suggesting that OMB review gives the executive branch a law-making
role in tension with Congressional legislative primacy).
Professor Buzbee points out that the limitations in the executive order made it clear
that statutes would govern in case of a conflict. See Buzbee, supra note 8, at 316. But he
also notes that OMB “sought to impose cost-benefit considerations in the context of
statutory mandates not allowing such considerations.” Id. at 316 n. 59. These conclusions
are consistent with two types of indeterminancy. Indeterminate results can stem from
clashes between a law-abiding agency and a rogue OMB with considerable political clout.
Legal indeterminancy may also come about if there is genuine doubt about whether the
statute does conflict with the executive order.
55

56

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. I will refer to this statute by its more colloquial name, the
Clean Water Act.
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Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)57, and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA)58.
1. TSCA and FIFRA Experience - Scholars who have studied TSCA
and FIFRA generally agree that application of cost-benefit criteria has
throttled regulation under key provisions of these two statutes.59 Indeed,
EPA has not banned a single chemical under TSCA since the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statute as requiring
that bans pass a cost-benefit test.60 The case cementing this interpretation,
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,61 rejected an EPA ban of asbestos, arrived
at after more than a decade of study62. Asbestos produced some of the most
easily understood and significant public health damage government
agencies have ever encountered. Asbestos causes a signature disease,
asbestosis, which allows regulators to differentiate the impact of this
substance from other environmental influences with unusual ease.63
Asbestos destroyed the health of so many workers that damages paid out
after tort suits addressing asbestos exposure bankrupted the asbestos
industry.64 Still, EPA lacked sufficient data to fully quantify asbestosis’
health effects;65 quantification would require detailed exposure data and an
understanding of a dose response curve, either of which could be lacking
even for a well proven health effect. The Corrosion Proof Fittings court
refused to permit EPA to give unquantified health effects substantial
weight.66 The court also took issue with some of the controversial
57

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.

58

29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

59

See McGarity, supra note 27, at 2343 (the process of CBA has “thoroughly stymied
government action under” TSCA and FIFRA).
60
See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the
toxic substances control act as requiring a cost-benefit approach to limiting toxic
substances);
61

947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).

62

Driesen, supra note 15, at 602-03.

63

Id. at 603.

64

Id. at 596.

65

Id. at 597 n. 226.

66

Corrosion Proof Fittings, 974 F.2d at 1219 “unquantified benefits . . . cannot . . . be
used to effect a wholesale shift in the balance beam.”).

February 28, 2005

NEUTRAL CBA

15

judgments EPA had to make to quantify costs and benefits.67 So, EPA was
unable to effectively regulate asbestos under TSCA, and gave up any
serious effort to regulate any substance under section 6 of TSCA after its
traumatic experience with CBA of asbestos.68 FIFRA has a similar history
of a cost-benefit test producing paralysis in addressing environmental and
health threats, partly because that test made it possible for industry to ward
off regulation by avoiding production of data (and occasionally falsifying
data) needed for risk assessment.69 Nobody disputes the view that the costbenefit criterion under these statutory provisions has largely stymied
regulation.70
2. OMB Review Under Other Statutes - OMB review seeks to
advance CBA’s cause even when the statute itself does not employ a costbenefit test. Commentators agree that OMB often subjects major rules
imposing fresh regulation upon industry to intensive review leading
agencies to weaken the regulations.71 They also agree that OMB often does

67

Id. at 1218-19 (taking issue with EPA’s approach to discounting, its decision to limit
the time period for quantifying benefits, its “reliance upon . . . population exposure.”)
68

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA 199 (Richard D. Morgenstern, ed. 1997) (noting that
EPA never regulated anything but PCB’s under section 6 after the reversal of the asbestos
rule). EPA had banned PCB’s long before.
69

See Johnston, supra note 47, at 1392 (EPA had reregistered only 2 of 19,000 older
pesticides by 1992, because of intense industry pressure); Donald Hornstein, Lessons from
Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10
YALE J. ON REG. 369, 436-37 & n. 395 (1993).
70

Some economists have studied the influences upon the decisions made about 19
pesticides under the cost-benefit regime. See Maureen L. Cropper, et al., The Determinants
of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE (Roger
D. Congleton, ed. 1996). They concluded that the agency’s assessment of costs and
benefits did influence its decisions about whether to cancel pesticides. Id. at 134. They
also conclude that political factors, such as the participation in decisions by growers and
environmentalists, and the disposition of the EPA chief influence results. Id. at 138. This
study, however, does not compare the CBA regime to an alternative to measure whether
CBA is neutral.
71

See, e.g., Morgenstern, supra note 68, at 458 (citing examples of “improvements
leading to decreased costs” consisting of largely of reductions of the stringency of rules);
Claudia O’Brien, White House Review of Regulations Under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 51, 72-101 (1993) (presenting case studies);
Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision
of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12, 291, 4 Va.
J. Nat’l Res. L. 1, 64-72 (1984) (discussing examples).
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not intensively review deregulatory measures.72 For example, OMB
engaged in protracted argument with EPA in the early 1980s over whether
EPA must prepare a CBA of a possible tightening of the particulate matter
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS), but it cleared EPA
revocation of the hydrocarbon NAAQS in two days with no formal CBA.73
Similarly, OMB cleared relaxation and suspension of noise reduction
requirements in two days.74 More recently, OMB declined to demand that
EPA employ CBA to analyze relaxation of new source review
requirements.75 This failure to demand CBA of major measures weakening
protection of health, safety, and the environment strongly suggests that the
review functions as a check on stringency, not as a means of objectively
assessing the merits of regulation.76
Both OMB’s critics and its supporters also agree that OMB does not
formally change all rules that it reviews. Its own published statistics
indicate that it frequently approves rules without major change.77 But the

72

See Olson, supra note 71, at 54 (1984) (citing a statement by a former OIRA
administrator admitting that OMB waives review for any rule reducing compliance cost);
GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN’S REGULATORY DILEMMA
122 (1984) (an agency declaration that a rule aimed to reduce the costs of regulation often
resulted in an exemption from OMB review under the Reagan executive order).
73

Olson, supra note 71, at 54.

74

Id.

75

See OMB, supra note 23, AT 108 (citing new source review changes as examples of
“regulatory reform accomplishments”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA SHOULD USE
AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO ITS NEW SOURCE
REVIEW PROGRAM 4 (2003) (EPA’S decision to relax new source review rules relied
primarily upon anecdotal information from industry).
76

See Richard N. L. Andrews, Economics and Environmental Decisions, Past and
Present, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER 79
(V. Kerry Smith, ed. 1984) (citing the failure to subject deregulatory decisions to CBA as
indicative of a bias in favor of deregulation).
77
See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 847-52 (2003) (discussing the percentages of rules
changed during the Clinton and Bush Administrations); GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 9
(concluding that OIRA review only had a significant effect on 25 of 85 draft rules during
a short period of the Bush Administration); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY
REFORM: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY REVIEW EXECUTIVE ORDER 8 (1996)
[hereinafter GAO 1996] (finding that the number of rules that were changed substantially
during OIRA review “increased substantially between 1981 and 1996"); James R. Bowers,
Establishing the Constitutional Legitimacy of OMB’s Regulatory Review: A Shared
Powers Perspective, 25 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 397, 411 (1990) (discussing the decline in
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data indicate that in reviewing EPA rules, OMB often significantly changes
between 45 and 75 percent of the rules it reviews.78 This may help explain
why environmental scholars view OMB influence as pervasive, while
scholars looking at general statistics may view it as much more benign.79
For the government as a whole, the number of rules that the OMB
influences might be small in percentage terms, but the absolute number of
rules that it influences through the formal regulatory review process
number in the thousands by this time.80 While OMB’s supporters tend to
emphasize the high percentage of rules that OMB says it has not changed
through formal review (which often hovers around 80%), its critics tend to
emphasize the large absolute number of rules that OMB influences. This
difference in emphasis should not obscure the agreement that both the
percentage of formally unaffected rules is high (at least outside the
environmental realm) and that the absolute number and significance of
rules changed through OMB review is also high (especially in the
environmental realm).

percentage of rules OMB found consistent with Executive Order 12, 291 between 1981 and
1987 to about 77%); Christopher C. DeMuth, & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House
Review and Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV L. Rev. 1075, 1088 (1986) (80% of rules
approved without change); Olson, supra note 71, at 41 (noting that while 86% of rules
cleared OMB without change as of 1982).
78
See GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 82 (chart shows that OMB significantly changed
45% of the EPA rules it reviewed during a one year period in 2002); GAO 1995, supra note
77, at 11-12 (while 55% of all rules submitted in 1994 were changed while at OIRA, 74%
of EPA rules were changed); (GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY REVIEW:
INFORMATION ON OMB’S REVIEW PROCESS 13 (1989) (from 1981-89 OMB found 75% of
government rules consistent with the executive order “without change” but only 52% of
the EPA rules)
79

See, e.g., Croley, supra note 77, at 873 (suggesting that the statistics suggest that
OMB review might be “benign”); Olson, supra note 71, at 41-55 (claiming that OMB
review significantly delays and weakens regulation).
80
See Bowers, supra note 77, at 411(537 rules per year between 1981-87 were
modified in response to OMB review). Steven Croley reports that the White House
(meaning OMB) reviewed 34,386 rules from 1981-2001. Croley supra note 77, at 846.
He reports that on average, half of the rules reviewed between 1993 and 2000 were
changed and 25% were changed from 1981 to October of 1993. Id. at 849. Since 25% of
the 34, 386 rules is more than 7,000 rules, his figures show that thousands of rules were
changed by OIRA review. Croley correctly notes that the data coding is such that we
cannot be sure that all of these changes are significant. Id. at 849 n. 70. He does not
mention the reports of informal OMB influence over rules not captured by the statistics he
reviews.
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Also, the General Accounting Office and scholars who have studied
OMB review have reported that OMB may influence rules that it does not
significantly change in the formal regulatory review process.81 OMB often
influences rules informally before undertaking review of a completed draft
regulation.82 And agency employees have reported that they avoid even
considering requirements that OMB would likely disapprove of.83 So,
OMB’s influence almost surely is more extensive than the statistics would
indicate, but hard data about the precise scope and nature of this informal
influence is difficult to produce.
II. CBA’S EFFECT
In spite of agreement on some points, CBA has recently generated
some apparently conflicting claims by legal scholars about the nature of
CBA’s impact upon the many rules that it significantly influences. Many
analysts claim that OMB review consistently favors less stringent
regulation when it takes any position at all, and that its review delays and
weakens regulation.84 Yet, Cass Sunstein cites several cases in which, he
claims, show that CBA has helped make environmental regulation more

81

GAO, supra note 52, at 130; (some types of OMB influence are not reflected in the
available documentation); Olson, supra note 71, at 41 (it is likely that OMB still had some
informal impact upon the substance of rules that it approves unchanged).
82

GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 7-8 (OIRA says that informal review prior to
submission has been increasing and can have a substantial affect on the substance of rules).
83

84

Id. at 130.

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
694 (1996); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency
Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17 & n. 99 (1994) (concluding that the Reagan and first
Bush Administrations adopted an “unstated goal” of “deregulation”); O’Brien, supra note
71, at 60 (in the Bush administration, cost-benefit tests were used to allow opponents of
regulation to oppose them “under the guise of objectivity”); Percival, supra note 50, at
10018 (claiming that an anti-regulatory philosophy undergirded the Reagan executive
order); Olson, supra note 71, at 55; Bowers, supra note 77, at 411 (OMB exercises a veto
over regulation). See also Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The President's Council on
Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Review, 6
Admin. L. Rev. 759, 762-63 (1993) (the Council on Competitiveness has persuaded
agencies to weaken or eliminate regulations relating to commercial aircraft noise, wetlands
protection, and air pollution); MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 286-87 (OMB has sought less
stringent regulations in hundreds of cases, but urged more stringent regulation in, “at most
a handful of cases.”)
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stringent or more extensive.85 He relies exclusively upon case studies
assembled by Richard Morgenstern, a former EPA economist, that include
cases where EPA used economic analysis to strengthen regulation, and
upon OMB’s use of “prompt” letter, which Sunstein characterizes as
examples of CBA spurring more extensive regulation.86
This section first examines the traditional view of the nature of
OMB review as anti-environmental. Then it will examine Sunstein’s
anecdotal information from the Morgenstern-edited case studies. Finally,
this section will update this earlier research based on experience under
George W. Bush. This last empirical analysis includes consideration of the
prompt letters relied upon by Sunstein in suggesting that CBA sometimes
spurs new regulation.
A. The Thesis that OMB Almost Always Favors Reduction in Stringency
Until relatively recently, the literature unanimously agreed that
OMB had consistently weakened, rather than strengthened environmental,
health, and safety standards.87 OMB review involves hundreds of cases of
OMB vetoing regulations.88 Much more frequently, however, the implicit
85

See SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 3, at 26-27.

86

See id. at 26-27, nn. 34-36.

87

See, e.g., Olson, supra note 71, at 55 (“research has not revealed a single instance
of OMB’s insistence that EPA maximize net benefits by increasing health or environmental
protection.”). Cf. MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 2-3 (suggesting, in 1998, that economic
analysis has made some regulation more stringent); SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 26-27 (in
2002, claiming that CBA makes regulation more stringent at times).
88

See MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 22 (during the Reagan years roughly eighty-five
rules per year were either returned to agencies for reconsideration or withdrawn by
agencies during OMB review); Bowers, supra note 77, at 411 (OMB vetoed 38 rules per
year between 1981 and 1987 and the agency withdrew an additional 52 per year); Olson,
supra note 71, at 41-42, 44 (OMB vetoed 101 regulations through the end of 1982,
including 31 EPA rules). OMB refers to these vetoes as “returns” of agency action. Olson,
supra note 71, at 41-42. But since some scholars have found that returned rules were never
promulgated, these commentators treat OMB “returns” as vetoes. Id. at 41-44. See also
Bowers, supra note 77, at 410 (arguing that the executive orders prohibition of proposal
in the federal register during OMB review and of promulgation of final rules before
responding to OMB review effectively create a veto). My review of recent Bush
Administration regulatory review, however, has uncovered a case where an agency
subsequently promulgated a safety rule supported by industry after it was “vetoed” through
a return letter. See Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, OMB to Rosalind
Knapp, Deputy General Counsel, Department of Transportation (August 8, 2001) (rejecting
proposal to regulate sport aircraft); Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for Light Sport
Aircraft, 69 FR 44772 (July 27, 2004) (to be codified at 14 CFR pts. 1, 21, 43, 45, 61, 65,
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threat of OMB veto or opposition to EPA budget requests has induced EPA
to beef up CBA and weaken regulation.89 OMB requests or suggestions
that rules should be made less stringent have often lengthened OMB review
and led to protracted negotiation about how much laxer to make them.90
This debate in itself delayed regulation and therefore subjected
beneficiaries to additional harms, while benefitting industry by reducing its
compliance cost.91 Often, agencies weakened their proposed rules or
abandoned them altogether in order to satisfy OMB, sometimes in response
to specific OMB suggestions and sometimes in anticipation of potential
problems with OMB review.92

and 91).
89

See Olson, supra note 71, at 45-48. See also Bowers, supra note 77, at 411 (537
rules per year between 1981-87 were modified in response to OMB review).
90
See id. at 48-49 (discussing delays stemming from interagency disputes between
OMB and EPA).
91

See McGarity, supra note 21, at 26 (delay can have enormous practical
consequences for regulation’s beneficiaries); Morrison, supra note 49, at 1064-65 (delay
paid for through decreased health and safety); Percival, supra note 50, at 10019-10020
(discovery revealed that OMB has not honored provisions in executive order requiring that
regulatory review respect statutory deadlines for promulgating rules). See, e.g., William
J. Nicholson & Philip J. Landrigan, Quantitative Assessment of Lives Lost Due to Delay
in Regulation of Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 85, 185
(1985) (suggesting that delay in promulgating OSHA’s benzene standard produced 30-490
additional leukemia cases).
92

See GAO 1996, supra note 77, at 10 (Department of Transportation officials said
they will not even propose certain regulatory provisions, because they know OIRA will not
accept them); Bowers, supra note 77, at 412 (agencies withdrew 52 rules per year between
1981 and 1987); Smith, supra note 76, at 134-35 (discussing reports that the prospect of
preparing a regulatory impact analysis for OMB review has discouraged them from
proposing new regulations); Kargman, supra note 53, at 1791-92 (giving examples of rules
vetoed, withdrawn, or substantially delayed). Professor McGarity provides an interesting
overview of the types of changes typically sought by OMB at various agencies. OMB
objected to agency rules that valued life too highly. MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 275.
OMB insisted in the 1980s on discount rates of 10 percent for environmental benefits,
while agencies wanted to use lower discount rates. ID. at 275. OMB fought for less health
protective models to extrapolate estimates of cancer risk from limited data. ID. at 275-77.
OMB argued for less expensive cut-off points for technology-based regulations, which
would lead to less stringent standards. ID. at 277. OMB sought to make EPA’s risk cutoff
for regulating carcinogens less stringent, seeking acceptance of a 1 in 100,000 risks of
contracting cancer. ID. at 278. OMB opposed worst case estimates of risk, thereby making
standards less protective. ID. What is so striking about these cases cumulatively, drawn
from a rich array of data, is that OMB has so uniformly favored approaches that tend to
reduce the protectiveness of standards.
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Even if one assumed that OMB exercised no informal antienvironmental influence beyond its formal review process, the traditional
view of OMB review as non-neutral would not conflict with the
observation that formal OMB review often leaves rules unchanged.93 If
OMB review, for example, made some important regulations less stringent,
left others delayed but unaltered, and never made any regulation more
stringent, its influence would be clearly negative from the standpoint of
environmental and health protection and clearly positive from the
standpoint of industry.
I will therefore frame the general issue about
CBA’s neutrality in the following terms: On the occasions when
government officials relying on CBA have sought to encourage significant
changes in a rule based on CBA, have they generally favored laxer or less
extensive regulation, or have they often favored more stringent or extensive
regulation? Until Sunstein’s book, there seemed little question about the
answer to that question: a CBA framework almost always led to laxer or
less extensive regulation.94
B. Neutral CBA?: An Analysis of Some Anecdotal Information
Richard Morgenstern, a former EPA economist edited a book
consisting of 12 case studies of the use of “economic analysis” at EPA. His
summary of the case studies claims that the analysis had contributed to cost
savings in all 12 regulations and to greater environmental benefits in five
regulations.95 The case studies themselves show that many of the cost
saving changes involved relaxing the stringency or reducing the scope of
regulation.96 The case studies associate economic analysis with increased

93

See Olson, supra note 71, at 41-42 (2 percent of the rules OMB reviewed through
1982 were effectively vetoed, but not changed, and agencies withdrew 81 rules in this
period, sometimes in response to signals from OMB).
94

See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 15, at 60 (CBA provided an “effective tool for
opponents of stringent environmental or health standards to challenge” them “under the
guise of objectivity”).
95

MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 458. Morgenstern lists “rule improvements”
associated with “economic analysis.” In all twelve of the rules his book studies, CBA led
to reduced cost. ID. Of course, the primary method for reducing cost involves making rules
laxer or delaying their implementation, thereby allowing harms to increase. And that is
clearly what is happening in at least ten of the twelve rules. Morgenstern only claims “rule
improvements” increasing benefits in five of the twelve rules analyzed. ID.
96

For example, EPA reduces reduced the number or products subject to an asbestos
ban, scaled back numerical criteria protecting the Great Lakes, reduced the frequency of
vehicle inspections checking deterioration of emission controls, created some exemptions
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regulatory benefits in the regulation of the Navajo Generating Station to
improve visibility in the Grand Canyon, pollution from organic chemical
factories, the reformulation of gasoline to reduce air emissions, lead in
drinking water, and lead levels in gasoline made by small refiners.97 These
studies focus on EPA’s own use of economic analysis, rather than OMB
regulatory review.
Proponents of CBA in the legal academy, such as Cass Sunstein,
have relied Morgenstern’s anecdotal information to argue that “Cost and
Benefits” are “for Everyone.”98 Sunstein cites four of the five cases
involving increased benefits of examples of CBA contributing to more
stringent regulation.99 Professor Sunstein then portrays CBA as evenhandedly helping to prevent the government from “imposing high costs for
little good”, while encouraging regulations that will “actually do some
good.”100 These case studies, as we shall see, cannot support the view that
CBA is even close to even-handed.
Even if all five cases involved CBA producing stricter regulation,
that information would not support broad conclusions about the regulatory
system as a whole. For the claim that CBA-inspired review slows and
reduces the stringency of regulation rests on dozens of cases, in several
careful studies focusing on the somewhat smaller domain of environmental,
health, and safety regulation.101 The assertion that CBA increases

to regulations of municipal landfills, scaled back requirements for control of water
pollution from chemical plants, and reduced the stringency of numerical criteria for
handling sludge. ID.
97

Id.

98

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 137.

99

SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 26-27 nn. 34-36.

100

101

SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 137.

See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 13 (1996) (providing three examples of proindustry regulatory changes suggested by OMB under Clinton, but not pro-environmental
changes); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:
The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARKANSAS L. REV. 161, 169-72 (1995)
(discussing the Council on Competitiveness’ support for weakening five regulations,
including some where CBA was involved); O’Brien, supra note 71, at 72-101 (providing
a detailed review of seven cases arising under the Clean Air Act in the early 1990s);
Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 219, 229-249 (1993) (providing a detailed case study of OMB and Council on
Competitiveness opposition to applying public comment requirements to all air pollution
permit revisions); MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 286-87 (citing hundreds of cases where
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stringency relies upon only four cases.102 If all of these cases supported the
claim that CBA has made regulation more rapid or stringent, one would
still be justified in concluding that CBA almost always makes it less
stringent. Because, the record would then indicate that it has made rules
less stringent in dozens of cases, but made it more stringent (or rapid) in
four or five.
In fact, however, only one of these cases shows an environmentally
positive influence from CBA. And the context of the one case of CBA
having environmentally positive influence, which involves reductions of
lead levels in the gasoline that small refiners produce, suggests that this
case depends on prior non-CBA based regulation and enormous economic
(i.e. non-health and environmental) benefits.

OMB has sought “less stringent” regulations); Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New
(Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 540-544 (1986-87) (detailing
derailment of numerous individual regulations and two entire regulatory programs);
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG. 1ST SESS., EPA’S ASBESTOS REGULATIONS: REPORT ON A CASE
STUDY OF OMB INTERFERENCE IN AGENCY RULEMAKING (1985) (detailing OMB efforts
to thwart a ban on asbestos); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d
1479, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (OSHA withdrew a short term exposure limit for ethylene
oxide in response to OMB objections); Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Dep’t
of the Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (D.D.C. 1983), reversed on other grounds, 797
F.2d 995, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (regulation requiring disclosure of the ingredients in
alcoholic beverages, partly for health reasons, rescinded after review under the E.O.
12291); Olson, supra note 71, at 41-42 (by the end of 1982 OMB had vetoed 101
regulations and the agencies had withdrawn 81 rules), 64-73 (providing case studies of
several regulations OMB sought to weaken).
102

See MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 458 (claiming that in five cases economic
analysis increased the benefits of regulation); SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 3,
26-27 (citing four of these same cases as evidence, citing Morgenstern).
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CBA in Dr. Morgenstern's Five Cases
CBA
Conducted103

CBA
Motivated
Stringency

Reformulated Gasoline

No

No

Organic Chemical Industry
Effluent Guidelines

Yes

No

Navajo Generating Station Air
Pollution

Yes

No

Lead in Drinking Water

Yes

No104

Lead in Gasoline

Yes

Yes

Neither Morgenstern nor the case study authors claim that CBA
helped make all five rules more stringent. The book claims that “economic
analysis” may have strengthened these rules.105 And it qualifies that
conclusion by noting that separating out the influence of any particular
form of analysis is problematic.106 The term economic analysis includes
any analysis of cost, including the forms of analysis, such as incremental
cost effectiveness analysis, that do not seek to monetize benefits. Hence,
legal scholars who have read Morgenstern’s book as claiming that “CBA”
has led to stringent regulation, even in just four cases, have distorted his
conclusions.107

103

I define CBA as analysis where at least some benefits have been quantified. The
items marked as having no CBA used other forms of economic analysis, as explained
below.
104
This is my own conclusion, not necessarily that of the case study author. She
argues that the analysis was one of many factors that helped get the regulation through. ID.
at 228. I justify my know characterization below.
105

ID. at 457-58.

106

ID. at 457.

107

See SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 3, at 26 (citing Morgenstern’s examples
of “economic analysis” making regulation more stringent to show that the record of “costbenefit analysis” at EPA is “generally encouraging”); Stewart, supra note 38, at 45 (citing
Morgenstern’s case studies as examples of “cost-benefit analysis” leading to more stringent
regulation).
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Professor Sunstein may have recognized that the case study of
organic chemical regulation offered weak support for the assertion that
economic analysis made the regulation of organic chemicals more stringent,
because Sunstein wisely does not cite the organic chemical rule as an
example of CBA making a rule more stringent, while adopting the four
remaining cases of benefit enhancement as evidence of CBA’s neutrality.108
As Morgenstern’s summary shows, EPA used the CBA in this rule to relax
standards for some segments of the industry.109 While he also lists the rule
as an example of an economic analysis linked to an improvement leading
to “increased benefits,” the benefit he cites is “encouragement” of air
emissions control.110 At the time of this rulemaking under the Clean Water
Act, the environmental community asked EPA to recognize that the waste
water streams regulated also generated air pollution and suggested that
EPA regulation should rely upon approaches that addressed both air quality
and water quality concerns.111 EPA rejected the suggestion and regulated
in a way that did not address the air quality impacts, declining to require
adoption of an approach, steam stripping, that would address both air and
water quality simultaneously.112 Instead, EPA “recommended,” but did not
require, that industry address the air emissions in its choice of
technology.113 Industry, predictably enough, did not choose the more
expensive and environmentally responsible option on its own.114 This is
simply not a case of CBA making a regulation more extensive or stringent.

108

See SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 3, at 26-27.

109

See MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 458.

110

ID.

111
Discussion with Jessica Landman, then a Senior attorney at the Natural Resources
Defense Council in Washington, D.C., in the early 1990s.
112

See Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards,
52 Fed. Reg. 42522, 42558 (November 5, 1987). 42547 (no PSES for volatiles) 42552
(plants may reduce their costs by not using steam stripping) 42558 (EPA considered but
rejected requiring steam stripping, preferring to rely on Clean Air Act authority) 42560
(rationale for waiting).
113

Id. at 42561.

114

Id. at 42552 (plants may reduce their costs by declining to employ steam stripping).
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The underlying case study of the reformulated gasoline rule reveals
that the agency did not carry out a CBA.115 It did not monetize the benefits
of regulation.116 This decision not to monetize destroys the case for CBA’s
influence on this regulation, because monetization of benefits distinguishes
CBA from other forms of economic analysis. EPA engaged in marginal
cost effectiveness analysis where it analyzes the cost per unit of reduction,
a form of analysis used for many technology-based regulation both before
and after the promulgation of the executive orders demanding
quantification, in dollar terms, of regulation’s benefits.117 While the case
study authors claim that the cost effectiveness analysis strengthened the
regulation,118 even that conclusion is qualified. First of all, the authors
recognize that the statutory standard governing this rulemaking severely
constrained EPA’s ability to make significant discretionary decisions.119
Congress did not simply authorize standards under some general criteria,
but specifically required a 15% reduction of Congressionally targeted
pollution in phase one and at least a 20% reduction in phase two.120
Accordingly, analysis of any kind would have a limited impact on this
rule.121 Second, EPA adopted the negotiated rule as the template for the
final rule, which would indicate that the parties’ agreement, not regulatory

115

See MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 400-01, 414 (the regulatory impact analysis
analyzed cost effectiveness, but did not monetize the benefits of alternatives).
116

ID. at 414-15 (except for the EPA’s estimate of the dollars per cancer case avoided
for toxic emissions, the regulatory impact analysis “did not attempt to quantify benefits.”).
Note that a dollar per cancer case figure does not itself monetize the benefit of avoiding a
cancer case.
117

See Reformulated Gasoline Rule, 59 Fed. Reg at 7747 (defining cost effectiveness
as the ratio of incremental cost of control to the tons of emissions reduced).
118

See MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 414.

119

See ID. at 394, 414.

120

ID. at 394. Congress established a default presumption of 25%, but granted EPA
the authority to depart from that presumption under some circumstances. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(k)(3)(B). But EPA lacked statutory authority to provide for less than a 20%
reduction under any circumstances. Id. EPA did go beyond the statutory minimums for
phase II nitrogen oxide reductions. MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 408.
121

See MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 394 (explaining that this statutory detail
restricted “the alternatives available to EPA.”).
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analysis produced this rule.122 In any case, the reformulated gasoline case
does not furnish an example of CBA, so it cannot provide an example of
CBA making a rule more stringent.
The visibility case study author acknowledges that the benefits
assessment performed by EPA had little impact upon the final rule,
because, not surprisingly, nobody could agree about the amounts of
monetized benefits in a visibility rule.123 This lack of impact of
monetization hurts the case for this rule as illustrative of CBA’s positive
impact, because CBA’s distinctive feature involves a comparison of
monetized benefits to costs. If the monetized benefits played little role in
the outcome, this calls into question the value of CBA and suggests that a
simpler alternative form of analysis might do at least as well at less cost.124
As it happens, the authors claim that the cost analysis influenced the
negotiations between the parties.125 That cost analysis indicated that a 90%
reduction calculated on an annual average would actually cost less than a
70% reduction calculated on the basis of a monthly average.126 This paved
the way for an agreement to a 90% reduction based on an annual average.127
The marginal cost effectiveness analysis described is a routine feature of
technology-based decision-making. This case offers little support for the
idea that CBA strengthens rules, but does support a more general claim that
“economic analysis” contributed to a resolution of the regulatory problem

122

There is one fairly major exception to this. The ethanol industry used political
pressure to procure favorable treatment in the reformulated gasoline rule, notwithstanding
a negotiated agreement to a fuel neutral approach. See generally, Reformulated Gasoline
Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7718-20 (February 16, 1994) (discussing adjustment in final rule
addressing the ethanol industry’s concerns). But CBA did not influence the Bush
administration’s decision to carve out a larger role for ethanol. Cf id. at 7719 (President
Bush announced a plan for ethanol in reformulated gasoline, because of ethanol’s
“importance to the nation’s energy and agricultural policy”).
123

MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 293.

124

Cf. Scott Farrow, Does Analysis Matter?: Economics and Planning in the
Department of Interior, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 172, 176 (1991) (concluding that a cruder
analysis that the CBA performed could have had equal influence on decisions about
offshore oil and gas leasing).
125

ID. at 291.

126

ID. at 291-92.

127

ID. at 292.
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before the agency.128 We have no way of knowing how the cost-benefit
ratio might have influenced the rule had it been an influential factor. The
part of the analysis that helped the rule become more stringent is part of
standard analysis conducted when nobody demands CBA.129 And EPA’s
final rule explains that the “benefits analysis forms no part of the legal basis
for” the visibility rule.130
The case study of lead in drinking water claims that CBA, not some
other form of analysis, had an environmentally positive influence on the
regulation.131 But this study does not strongly support the idea that the
CBA led to a more stringent regulation than EPA would have promulgated
without CBA.132 The underlying statute, the Safe Drinking Water Act,
required EPA to set a maximum contaminant level goal at a level that
protects health and safety.133 EPA set this unenforceable goal at zero,
because it believed that no safe threshold had been established for some of
lead’s health effects.134 Hence, CBA had no influence on this part of the
rulemaking.
The Act required EPA to supplement this goal with an enforceable
“national primary drinking water regulation,” which it must set as close the
(zero level) goal as feasible.135 The case study claims that the CBA played
128
EPA, in the final rulemaking notice, did state that it had “carefully weighed . . . the
estimated cost of compliance . . . and the visibility benefits” in concluding that the rule it
adopted “is a reasonable exercise of its delegated rulemaking authority.” Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Revision of the Visibility FIP for Arizona, 56 Fed.
Reg. 50172, 50182 (October 3, 1991). But, as the case study author points out, the heart
of the decision involved an unusual conclusion that a 90% reduction cost less than a less
demanding percentage reduction earlier proposed. Id.
129

In particular, the marginal cost effectiveness analysis indicated that achieving a
larger reduction than industry initially favored would not significantly increase the cost.
This is that the additional reduction ultimately agreed upon could be realized by optimizing
the technology already needed to meet the limit industry was inclined to agree to. This sort
of consideration can influence technology-based rulemaking when nobody even thinks of
attempting to monetize the benefits in reducing ecological consequences and protecting
human health.
130

Visibility Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 50184.

131

MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 228.

132

See ID. at 228-30 (pointing to numerous factors that influenced the rule).

133

ID. at 206.

134

ID. at 209.

135

ID. 206-07.
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an “unusually prominent role” in setting the enforceable standard, which
the author describes as more stringent than EPA initially planned.136 But
the author says that this stringency stemmed from “many factors,” not just
CBA.137 This raises the question of whether these other factors would have
sufficed to motivate the stringent regulation adopted even without the CBA.
In other words, the study demonstrates that a favorable cost-benefit ratio
helped make the case for the rule, but it does necessarily demonstrate that
the rule was stricter than it would have been in the absence of CBA. In
fact, in describing concretely the changes made in the rule as it progressed,
the authors claim that EPA based its key requirement, an “action level” that
triggered treatment obligations, on “technical feasibility” considerations.138
Furthermore, although the CBA showed that the replacement of lead
service pipes generated costs exceeding the quantified benefits,139 EPA
required replacement when cheaper corrosion control proved ineffective.140
This lead service pipe replacement provision suggests that CBA could have
justified weakening this rule, but that EPA decided instead to protect public
health as much as feasible, as the statute required. The federal register
notice itself does not claim that CBA influenced the decision in anyway,
instead relying solely upon feasibility and simplicity considerations to
justify the regulation.141
The strongest case for the idea that CBA has, at least once, led to
strengthened rules involves the regulation of lead in gasoline. Considered
in context, however, this case provides very limited support for CBA’s
neutrality.
When industry began to use lead gasoline as an additive in the
1920s, we already had substantial knowledge of lead’s adverse effects.142
Accordingly, public health officials questioned its introduction into

136

ID. at 228.

137

ID.

138

ID. at 214.

139

ID. at 228-229.

140

See Maximum Contamination Level Goals and National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations for Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. 26460, 26503 (June 7, 1991).
141

142

See id. at 26472-77, 26483-84.

See James Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead 12-13 in THE NATION
(March 20, 2000); Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, Cater to the Children: The Role
of the Lead Industry in a Public Health Tragedy, 1900-1955, 90 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 36
(2000).
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gasoline.143 Had a regime prohibiting pollution with a history of links to
serious health effects been in place, this regime would have prohibited the
introduction of lead into gasoline.144 Instead, government attempted to
ascertain whether firm direct proof existed that lead in gasoline would
poison consumers. Since the data did not exist to quantify the health
effects or even directly prove their existence through environmental
exposures, the Surgeon General allowed lead into gasoline, thus authorizing
the growing petroleum industry to create a serious public health problem
that might have been avoided.145
In the 1970s, however, Congress passed the Clean Air Act146 and
EPA began to address the problem of lead in gasoline.147 EPA could not
conclusively prove that leaded gasoline caused serious health effects at
levels prevalent in the environment or estimate the probabilities of harm,
largely because of the difficulty of distinguishing leaded gasoline’s effect
upon human health from that of other lead sources in the environment.148
EPA, however, had good reason to suspect the worst, given the abundant
evidence of serious health damage from high levels of lead.149
Accordingly, EPA ordered an 80 percent reduction of the lead content of
gasoline, finding that lead posed “substantial risk of harm.”150 A panel of
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
however, reversed EPA’s order, finding that the “case against lead

143

Kitman, supra note 142, at 20, 26.

144

Id. at 32 (discussing 3000 year old body of evidence that lead is a poison).

145

Id. at 12, 30, 32.

146

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1698.
While this public law amended a pre-existing Clean Air Act, it expanded the federal role
in securing clean air so significantly that many experts refer to the 1970 Amendments as
the “Clean Air Act.”
147

See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 7 n. 1 (1976) (en banc) (all sections of the
Clean Air Act pertinent to the regulation of lead in gasoline were added in the 1970
Amendments).
148

See id. at 8,10 (explaining the impossibility of distinguishing effects of general lead
exposure made “hard proof” of danger from lead in gasoline “hard to come by”).
149

150

See id. at 7-9 (reviewing the evidence before EPA).

Id. at 12; Frank Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling, and Rachel Massey, Wrong in
Retrospect: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Past Successes, 9 & n. 42 (2005) (forthcoming)
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emissions is a speculative . . . one at best.”151 Because EPA was unable to
quantify the benefits from lead reduction, or even conclusively prove that
benefits existed, a recent study argues that this regulation could not have
passed a cost-benefit test.152
Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the panel decision, by a narrow 5-4 vote, and allowed EPA’s lead
reduction order to go into effect. 153 This decision interpreted EPA’s
authority to regulate fuel additives that “will endanger the public health. .
.” in a quite precautionary manner.154 The majority opinion did not require
proof that harm existed or was even probable.155 Nor did it require much
justification for the particular level of regulation chosen. Rather, it allowed
EPA to draw conclusions from “suspected” relationships between facts,
trends, theoretical projections, and preliminary data.156 This sort of
qualitative risk assessment justified the lead standard, but a quantitative
risk assessment was then impossible.157 Congress promptly made sure that
the en banc view of the statute would endure, by rewriting the statute to
squarely repudiate the earlier panel decision that had refused to allow EPA
to reach “speculative” conclusions. It amended the “will endanger”
language to allow EPA to regulate when additives “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger . . . the public health . . .”158
The large reduction of lead in gasoline that followed the en banc
decision made it possible to produce the data that made quantitative risk
assessment feasible for further reductions of lead from gasoline. The

151

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1353, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

152

See Ackerman, Heinzerling, & Massey, supra note 150, at 4 (“if we had waited .
. . for a cost-benefit study to show net benefits from the first round of lead removal, we
might still be waiting today.”)
153
See Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 55 (stating that EPA’s lead abatement order could be
enforced).
154

See id. at 13 (explaining the “precautionary interpretation” of the “will endanger”
standard).
155

See id. at 17-18 (stating that will endanger standard “does not require proof of
actual harm” and then rejecting industry argument that the standard requires that the
occurrence of the threatened harm be probable”).
156

Id. at 28.

157

Id.

158

42 U.S.C. § 7545(c).
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reduction in lead allowed researchers to compare levels of lead in the blood
after the lead reduction to levels prior to the EPA order.159 This comparison
showed something that EPA only suspected at the time of the lead
reduction order upheld in Ethyl, that reductions in lead in gasoline
translated into significant reductions of lead in the blood stream.160 It also
provided researchers with the opportunity to study the link between health
effects and varied amounts of levels of lead in the blood, thus providing
data to map out a dose response curve. This data then made it possible to
make reasonable projections of some of the benefits that a further reduction
of lead would provide.
Notwithstanding the emerging health data, OMB, the principal
enforcer of CBA requirements in the executive order, and Vice-President
Bush’s regulatory task force sought to pressure EPA into significantly
relaxing its standards for lead in gasoline shortly after President Reagan
came into office.161 This pressure did not reflect the results of any formal
analysis, but used the “Executive Order’s cost-benefit standard as an excuse
for regulatory relief.”162 Indeed, the Reagan Administration sought to
hinder the Center for Disease Control from requiring lead screening
programs to report data to it.163 Eric Olson, the author of a leading study
of OMB review, cites this as a rare instance in which OMB lost a
bureaucratic battle with EPA in the early Reagan administration.164
Nevertheless, CBA does seem to have played a major role in
motivating EPA to take a smaller subsequent step than the initial phase-out
OMB had sought to relax, the phase-down of lead levels from small

159

See United States Civilian Blood Lead Levels Down One-Third: Preliminary Data
Shows, 12 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1546 (March 26, 1982) [hereinafter Blood Levels] (decline
is a clear result of the prior lead phase-down).
160

Kitman, supra note 142, at 37.

161

Olson, supra note 71, at 37; MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 30-31 (providing some
detailed information about this development); Blood Levels, supra note 159, at 44.
162

Seidenfeld, supra note 84, at 15. See MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 31-44 (describing
the decision to engage in marginal cost effectiveness analysis rather than CBA).
163

164

Kitman, supra note 142, at 37.

Olson, supra note 71, at 44. Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2278-79 (2001) (by 1984, the OMB director could point to only five
additional instances where EPA issued rules over OMB objections, four of them under
judicial order).
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refiners in 1985.165 While one might argue that an agency sufficiently
dedicated to protecting public health would have done this anyway, in light
of the strong scientific data brought into existence by precautionary
regulation, the lead case study author makes clear that CBA helped focus
the agency on this rule as a priority, when it faced no statutory deadline to
write this rule.166 Hence, this case does seem to offer reasonably good
evidence of CBA motivating an increase in stringency.
In both the case of regulation of lead in gasoline and in drinking
water, the case study authors claim that CBA helped advance the case for
stricter regulation. In the case of lead, however, even quantification of a
tiny fraction of the benefits sufficed to show a positive net benefit. Indeed,
the leaded gasoline example presented an unusually simple case for CBA,
because a fairly costly environmental measure (lead reduction) passed
muster in terms of economic net benefits, even without considering health
benefits. Reducing lead in gasoline generated $1.1 billion in savings from
reduced vehicle maintenance and fuel costs, a figure nearly twice that of the
estimated cost of EPA’s proposed lead reduction.167 In that circumstance,
all of the problems with quantifying health effects that opponents of CBA
complain about should not matter, since one could estimate the value as
zero and still be for the regulation on cost-benefit grounds. Hence, the lead
in gasoline case shows that CBA can help make regulations stricter when
regulators need not quantify health effects to show that a regulation passes
a cost-benefit test.

165

MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 77.

166

ID. at 52-53, 77.

167

ID. at 71.
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C. OMB under George W. Bush
The dozens of cases of OMB using demands for CBA to seek less
stringent rules suggest that CBA, in practice, is anti-environmental,
notwithstanding the lead case. This article updates the record with a study
of the George W. Bush administration’s use of CBA. President Bush
appointed an especially dedicated proponent of CBA, John Graham, to head
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the office with
OMB that oversees compliance with executive order 12866.168 So an
advocate of CBA as a neutral reform might expect OMB to use CBA
neutrally, to strengthen some rules, while weakening others.
1. OMB Regulatory Review: A Systematic Survey - This subsection
addresses a simple question, when OIRA significantly changes rules, does
it always weaken them, or does it sometimes strengthen them? While this
question is easy to ask, it is very difficult to answer.169 So, this subsection
focuses on a representative set of rules for intensive study.
In order to avoid problems of selection bias, this subsection reports
results of a study of a data set created by the General Accounting Office
(GAO). GAO recently published a study of all OMB reviews of rules from
all major environmental, health, or safety agencies completed between June
of 2001 and July of 2002.170
GAO concluded that OMB “had significantly affected 25 rules”
reviewed during this period.171 So, this study examines all of these 25 rules
to figure out whether OMB regularly suggested changes that would reduce
environmental, health, and safety benefits in order to reduce regulatory
burdens, or instead, frequently suggested changes that would increase
environmental, health, and safety benefits, thereby likely raising the
burdens on regulated parties.
168

See GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 44 (agency officials report that Graham’s OIRA
is “relentless” in demanding quantification of costs and benefits).
169

In order to answer this question, I have examined documents in agency rulemaking
dockets, information in the GAO report, federal register notices, judicial decisions, and
reports from environmental groups. I have also interviewed government officials within
agencies and OMB, but generally preserved their anonymity by not citing them. I have
sought to corroborate any data received through interviews or environmental groups with
documentary evidence.
170

GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 5. I use the term “major environmental, health, or
safety agency” to refer to all agencies that submitted five or more health, safety, or
environmental review during the period GAO reviewed. See id.
171

ID. The GAO defines significant changes that affecting “the scope, impact, or
estimated costs and benefits” of the rule. ID. at 73
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A review of these rules showed that OMB never supported changes
that would make environmental, health, or safety regulations more
stringent. In 24 of the 25 cases, all of the changes that OMB suggested
would weaken environmental, health, or safety protection.172 In one case,
OMB returned an FAA rule because of concern about a provision that
would have no discernible impact on safety.173 In every single case, OMB
favored changes that would reduce the burdens of regulation on regulated
parties. This suggests that in practice CBA is used consistently to oppose
environmental, health and safety regulation.
Nature of Changes OMB Sought
Anti-Environmental, Health, or
Safety

Burden
Reducing

Stricter

Ye
s

24

25

0

No

1

0

25

a. Examples of the Changes OMB Sought and their
Significance. - OMB review wholly eviscerated some regulations. For
example, at OMB’s urging, EPA scratched plans to promulgate new
effluent guidelines regulating one of the most significant remaining
sources of water pollution, storm runoff from construction.174 Runoff is
the largest known source of bacterial contamination, which leads to

172

I set out a list of rules in the appendix.

173

This case involved an FAA rule governing certification of foreign repair stations
to fix FAA regulated airplanes. See Repair Stations, 66 Fed. Reg. 41088 (August 6, 2001).
OMB objected to a requirement that foreign repair stations show that their services are
needed by FAA-regulated aircraft as potentially inconsistent with United States free trade
obligations. See Letter From Donald R. Arbuckle, Deputy Administrator, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs to Rosalind A. Knapp, General Counsel, Department
of
Transportation,
July
20,
2001,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return/faa_repair_stations_rtnltr-dot.html. Since
this requirement makes certification dependent on practical necessity, rather than safety,
it is unlikely that OMB’s initial opposition to this requirement, if adopted, would have
undermined safety in anyway. The FAA initially adopted this requirement simply to limit
its own workload. See Foreign Repair Station Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 47362, 47366
(November 22, 1988).
174

See GAO, supra note 52, at 176. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source
Performance Standards for the Construction and Development Category, 69 Fed. Reg.
22472 (April 26, 2004) [hereinafter, Construction Rule Withdrawal] (withdrawing the
proposed effluent guidelines that OMB objected to).
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thousands of annual beach closures in the United States.175 It also has
enormous negative impacts on both water quality and supply.176 Runoff
occurs both during construction and afterwards.177 So, changes in how
construction is carried out and in the design of development projects can
reduce runoff.178 But OMB opposed EPA’s rule to address these
impacts, and EPA eventually decided to scratch meaningful federal
controls.179
Each year, plants generating electricity kill numerous aquatic organisms,
including fish, marine mammals, sea turtles, shellfish, and crustaceans, because large
plants take in more than 70 trillion gallons of water.180 Indeed, one large facility, the
Salem nuclear power plant, kills 359.4 million fish annually through water intake.181
Accordingly, EPA proposed that 69 large plants in ecologically sensitive areas
recirculate or reuse water to reduce fish kills by up to 98 percent.182
OMB disapproved of this proposal and persuaded EPA to adopt a cheaper and
much less stringent proposal.183 EPA’s weaker final rule ostensibly required a 60%

175

NANCY STONER AND ROBIN GREENWALD, COMMENTS OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL AND THE WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE ON EPA’S PROPOSED EFFLUENT
GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY 2-3
(December 20, 2002) (copy on file with author).
176

ID. at 2-5.

177

See ID. at 3.

178

See ID. at 4-5; Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance
Standards for the Construction and Development Category (Proposed Rule), 67 Fed. Reg.
42644, 42644 (June 24, 2002).
179

See Construction Rule Withdrawal, 69 Fed. Reg. 22472.

180

OMB Watch, OMB Weakens EPA Proposal to Limit Fish Kills from Power Plants
(2002), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1074/1/132.
181

Id.

182

See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,059, 49,103 (proposed
Aug. 10, 2000) (estimating 72 to 98% reduction in entrainment); National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing Cooling Water Intake Structures
for New Facilities, Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256, 65,266 (Dec. 18, 2001) (to be codified
at 40 CFR Parts 9, 122, et al.) (rule would apply to 69 plants in ecologically sensitive
areas).
183

See GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 195-96 (detailing changes).
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reduction in entrainment.184 But it allowed pollution sources to evade this
requirement by agreeing to restoration measures185 of dubious efficacy. The United
States Court of Appeals invalidated this restoration provision as contrary to the Clean
Water Act.186 OMB favored changes in this rule that greatly reduced its capacity to
protect the environment.
Large ships and tankers generate over 200,000 tons of nitrogen oxide
emissions per year.187 Nitrogen oxides emissions contribute to particulate pollution,
which scientists associate with tens of thousands of annual deaths in the United
States.188 It also acts as a key ingredient in the formation of ground level ozone,
which causes lung damage and exacerbates asthma, leading to thousands of
emergency room visits every summer.189
EPA prepared a proposal to implement modest “tier one" limits on emissions
already agreed to by international treaty and which embody the limits already
achieved by industry.190 It also proposed a second tier of standards providing a 30%
reduction below the tier 1 levels.191 OMB opposed the tier two limits and EPA
finalized a rule that did nothing more than formalize limits that industry already had
met.192
Scientists have linked manganese to a variety of health problems, including
respiratory problems, sexual dysfunction, damage to the nervous system, mental and
emotional disturbances, and Manganism, a disease with symptoms similar to

184

OMB Watch, supra note 180.

185

See Riverkeeper v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 189 (2nd Cir. 2004) (describing restoration
measures alternative).
186

See id. at 189-91.

187

Control of Emissions From New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or Above
30 Liters Per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, 9755 (February 28, 2003) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9 & 4)
188

See Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

189

See id. at 407. Ships also emit carbon monoxide. Id. And nitrogen oxide can
impair visibility and acidify eco-systems.
190

See id. at 408; Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New Marine
Compression-Ignition Engines At or Above 30 Liters/Cylinder, 67 Fed. Reg. 37548,
37597-98 (Proposed May 29, 2002).
191

192

Proposal on New Large Marine Engines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37551.

New Large Marine Compression-Ignition Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9748-49; GAO
2003, supra note 52, at 160.
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Parkinson’s disease.193 Accordingly, EPA proposed to list magnesium as a hazardous
waste, which would trigger obligations to treat it properly to prevent contamination of
drinking water and soil.194 OMB opposed the listing and EPA abandoned it.195
After a series of airplane accidents, safety experts became very concerned
about the problem of aging planes. In one these accidents, the hull, cabin walls, and
roof of a Boeing 737 blew off.196 While the pilot managed to land the plane safely, a
flight attendant was swept overboard to her death. In response, Congress passed the
Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1991197, which directed the FAA to issue a rule to
address concerns about aging aircraft. Congress directed the FAA to write
regulations that “ensure the continued air worthiness of aging aircraft.”198

193

See C.W. Olanow, Manganese-induced Parkinsonism and Parkinson’s Disease,
1012 ANN N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 209 (2004) (discussing the similarities and differences between
Manganism and Parkinson’s Disease); H. Sincquk-Walczak, M. Jakubowski, & W.
Matczak, Neurological and Neurophysiological Examinations of Workers Occupationally
Exposed to Manganese, 14 INT. J. OCCUP. MED. ENVIRON. HEALTH 329 (2001) (discussing
increased emotional irritability, dysmnesia, concentration difficulties, sleepiness and limb
paresthesia in workers subjected to low level manganese exposure); D. Mergler & M.
Baldwin, Early Manifestations of Manganese Neurotoxicity in Humans: An Update, 73
ENVTL. RES. 92 (1997) (discussing the pattern of slowing motor functions, increased
tremor, reduced response speed, enhanced olfactory sense, memory and intellectual
deficits, and mood changes that result from exposure to manganese); B. Baranski, Effects
of the Workplace on Fertility and Related Reproductive Outcomes, 101 ENVIRON. HEALTH
PERSPECT., Supp. 2 81 (1993) (discussing sexual dysfunction associated with manganese
exposure).
194

Even without listing, some waste containing magnesium would trigger treatment
obligations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). For non-listed
waste is treated as hazardous waste if it exhibits a toxic characteristic based on testing.
Regulated parties, however, might escape treatment obligations by diluting a waste
exhibiting a toxic characteristic. EPA, however, treats waste mixed from or derived from
a listed waste as a hazardous waste. Hence, the decision not to list magnesium might well
exempt some waste from treatment obligations.
195

GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 9; Memorandum from Robert Kayser to RCRA
Docket Number F-2001-ICMF-FFFF, Final Rule Changes Resulting from OMB
Comments, 32-33 October 31, 2001 (explaining the reasons for OMB opposition);
Hazardous Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste:
Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing Wastes; Land Disposal Restrictions for Newly
Identified Wastes; and CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation and Reportable
Quantities, 66 Fed. Reg. 56258, 58260 (November 20, 2001).
196

William Stockton, Changes in Maintenance Sought to Keep Old Planes Flying
Safely, N.Y. TIMES, December 30, 1988, at A14.
197

Pub. L. 102-143, Title IV, October 28, 1991, 105 Stat. 951.

198

49 U.S.C. § 44717(a)(1).
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More than a decade later, FAA prepared a rule to require government
inspections and reviews of safety and maintenance records beginning in an aircraft’s
15th year of service and damage-tolerance-based inspections. OMB returned the rule
to the FAA.199 FAA later promulgated an interim final rule requiring inspections and
record reviews designed to prevent aging airplanes from crashing.200 But it has
delayed compliance deadlines for many years and continued to take comments on the
proper content of the rule.201 OMB’s concerns have led to decisions preventing the
requirements from this rule from becoming effective, thereby increasing safety risks.
OMB intervention seeking significant changes in rules sometimes did not
have such dramatic results.202 For example, OMB sought changes in a rule regulating
motorcycle emissions that would expand exemptions for small manufacturers and
weaken the stringency of an emissions trading option.203 More importantly, it
questioned the safety of catalytic converters, the primary technology EPA relied upon
in concluding that regulated companies could comply with the rule’s limits.204 In the
end, however, EPA persuaded OMB to live with the rule as written, after motorcycle
companies supported EPA’s preferred approach to averaging and argued that the
safety concerns were ill-founded.205
b. Conclusions from the 25 Cases - While the results of OMB review
varied, the substantive direction basically did not. OMB almost always (24 out of 25

199
Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator to Ms Rosalind Knapp, Deputy
General, Department of Transportation, September 14, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return/faa_corrosion_return_letter.html.
200

Aging Airplane Safety, 67 Fed. Reg. 72726 (December 6, 2002).

201

See Advisory Circulars (AC) 91-60A, 120-XX, and 91-56B; Extension of Comment
Period to Notices of Availability, 68 Fed. Reg. 5783 (February 4, 2003) (extending
comment period).
202

OMB intervention, for example, sometimes focused on changing compliance
deadlines. See, e.g., GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 161 (reporting rule).
203

See Responses to OMB Questions/Issues Highway Motorcycles Final Rule, item
14, in Docket A-2000-02, IV-H-7; Highway Motorcycle Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 2436,
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 86.407-78; Letter from Robert French, EPA, to Amy L. Farrell,
OMB, re: Limitations on Averaging (October 21, 2003), A-2000-02, IV-H-12.
204

205

See Responses to OMB Questions, supra note 203, item 13.

See Memorandum from Karl Simon, OTAG to Air Docket A-2002-02, re Meeting
Summary (December 1, 2003), air docket A-2000-02, IV-E-26 (recounting the meeting).
See also Email from Karl Simon, USEPA to Amy Farrell, Office of Management and
Budget re: Closure of NHTSA Investigation of Honda Gold Wing Frame Failure (October
17, 2003), air docket A-2000-02, IV-H-29; Control of Emissions for Highway Motorcycles,
69 Fed. Reg. 2938 (January 15, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 86, 90, 1051).
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times) suggested that agencies delay or weaken safety, health, and environmental
protections in some way.
Proponents of CBA suggest that CBA avoids “lavish” expenditures on trivial
regulations, while strengthening regulations that might “do some good.” The data do
not suggest that anything like this is going on.
First of all, in all six of the cases where an agency provided a CBA, the
agency ultimately found that the benefits would exceed the costs.206 Yet OMB
favored weaker regulation or opposed the regulation in all six cases.207
OMB's Response to Favorable Cost-Benefit Ratios
Agency Found Favorable Cost-Benefit Ratio
Number of Rules

6

OMB Seeks Laxer Regulation

6

OMB Disputes Favorable Ratio

3

OMB Does not Dispute Favorable Ratio

3

In three of these cases, OMB did not seem to dispute the agency’s contention
that benefits exceeded cost, but urged the agency to weaken its standards anyway.208

206

See FRANK ACKERMAN, USES AND ABUSES OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SETTING
STORMWATER REGULATIONS, 6 (December 18, 2002) (available in rulemaking docket for
the construction rule) (explaining that after EPA’s consultant corrected initial errors, the
agency concluded that monetized benefits outweigh costs); EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS
ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL SECTION 316(B) PHASE II EXISTING FACILITIES, A2-2 (Feb. 2004)
[hereinafter EXISTING FACILITIES ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE FINAL REGULATIONS ADDRESSING COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES FOR NEW
FACILITIES, 2-2 (Nov. 2001); Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large Spark Ignition
Engines and Recreational Vehicles (Marine & Land-Based), 67 Fed. Reg. 68242, 68244
(November 8, 2002) (proposed) [hereinafter Snowmobile Rule] (estimating cost of $210
million, “social gain” from fuel savings of $550 million, and benefits of $8 billion); Public
Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2nd Cir. 2003) (benefits of NHTSA’s proposal to
monitor the pressure of all four tires outweighs the costs); Certification of Aircraft and
Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft, 67 Fed. Reg. 5368, 5397-99 (Proposed
February 5, 2002); Aircraft Regulatory Analysis Branch, APO-320 Office of Aviation
Policy and Plans, Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation: Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Determination, International Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates: Proposed
Rule Corrosion Prevention and Control Program i, 23-25 (2001) (monetized benefits of
proposed corrosion prevention rule outweigh the costs).
207

See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. Cf. Farrow, supra note 124, at 176
(finding that economic analysis of offshore gas and oil leasing decisions met a “de minimus
standard for affecting decisions based on statistical significance”).
208

These cases are EPA’s rule on emissions from Snowmobiles and other recreational
vehicles, Snowmobile Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 68242, EPA’s rule protecting fish from power
plant water intakes, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System: Regulations
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EPA’s rule limiting emissions from snowmobiles provides an example of that sort of
case. EPA originally proposed a 50 percent reduction in snowmobile pollution and
produced a CBA showing that the monetary benefits from the fuel savings alone was
more than double the implementation cost, even without considering any
environmental benefit.209 OMB apparently agreed that benefits exceeded costs,210 but
did not consider the analysis adequate.211 It complained about EPA’s failure to
discuss whether particular models of snowmobiles might be forced off the market,
suggested EPA consider more regulatory alternatives, and demanded that EPA
quantify the environmental benefits.212 Faced with a set of nearly impossible
demands, since visibility and habitat impacts defy reliable quantification and
differentiating impacts upon different snowmobile models would require an
enormous investment in agency resources and the cooperation of the industry
resisting the regulation, EPA simply weakened the regulation. It promulgated a rule
demanding only a 30 reduction in carbon monoxide.213 In justifying this relatively
Addressing Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
65,256, 65,266 (Dec. 18, 2001), and the FAA’s rule on addressing corrosion in airplanes,
Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 62142 (proposed October 3,
2002). In some of these cases, OMB did question the cost-benefit analysis, but there is no
suggestion in the docketed communications that these objections would lead to flipping the
conclusion that benefits exceed costs. The corrosion rule addressed an inspection program
that would not be expected to generate very large costs and could save lives. In the rule
involving saving fish from water intake impacts on power plants, I have no information
indicating that OMB disputed the conclusion that benefits outweighed costs, but it may
have thought that a laxer rule would generate a larger benefit to cost ratio. See EPA,
ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL SECTION 316(B) PHASE II EXISTING
FACILITIES, D1-4 (Feb. 2004). There is also reason to believe that OMB did take issue
with EPA’s analysis of costs and benefits in various ways. But it is not clear that OMB
believed that the costs outweighed the benefits, especially as many important benefits were
not quantified. I analyze the snowmobile rule below.
209

See OMB 2004, supra note 17, at 106 (estimating annual compliance cost at $190
million annually and fuel cost savings at $770 million annually).
210
See OMB, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 11 (2003) (the recreational engine rule had monetized

benefits exceeding costs). While OMB does not formally approve the cost or benefit
estimates in this and similar reports, research has revealed no OMB objection to the
agency’s overall conclusion.
211

See Letter from John Graham, OIRA Administrator to Jeffrey Holmstead, Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation (September 24, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov /omb/inforeg/spark_engines_epa_sep2001.html.
212

See id.

213

See Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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weak standard, it relied rather heavily upon OMB’s concern that stricter standards
might force some models of snowmobiles off the market.214
The United States Court of Appeals for the District Columbia Circuit
reviewed this rule in Bluewater Network v. EPA.215 The court chided EPA for
implicitly assuming that “no existing model could be eliminated.”216 As a result of
EPA’s decision to act on the basis of OMB’s concerns, the court found EPA’s rule
arbitrary and capricious.217 As the court noted, however, EPA had not linked this
concern to the statutory feasibility criterion, which allowed the agency to consider
cost.218 While EPA could not quantify the environmental benefits of the rule, it
eventually quantified the health benefits, which it estimated at $8 billion.219 While
the disparity between the $8 billion dollar benefit estimate and the $210 million
estimated cost suggested that the rule was too lax, OMB did not push for a more
stringent rule based on this disparity. Instead, it encouraged EPA to promulgate a
rule that was so lax as to be held arbitrary by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
In three of the six cases involving CBA, however, OMB disagreed with the
agency’s conclusion that benefits exceeded costs.220
Cases in Which OMB Disputed Favorable Cost-Benefit Ratios
Court Disagrees with
OMB

214

Id. at 21.

215

370 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

216

Id. at 21.

217

Id.

218

Id.

Benefits Disputes

219

See Control of Emissions From Nonroad Large Spark-Ignition Engines, and
Recreational Engines (Marine and Land-Based), 67 Fed. Reg. 68242, 68244 (November
8, 2002).
220

These cases are the stormwater runoff rule, Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
New Source Performance Standards for the Construction and Development Category, 69
Fed. Reg. 22472 (April 26, 2004), an FAA proposal to regulate sport aircraft, Certification
of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft, 67 Fed. Reg. 5368
(Proposed February 5, 2002), and a NHTSA proposal to require devices monitoring tire
pressure, see Public Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2003). Such disagreements
occurred regularly under previous administrations as well. See Seidenfeld, supra note 84,
at 43 (discussing “fundamental differences” between how OMB staff and agency officials
“valued particular costs and benefits.”)
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Construction Effluent
Guidelines

X

Light-Sport Aircraft Rule

X

Tire Pressure Monitoring Rule X
X
In one of three cases, a court implicitly held that OMB was wrong. This case
involved a response to the Department of Transportation (DOT) investigation into
tread separation on two models of Bridgstone/Firestone tires installed on Ford
Explorers, which led to the recall of over 14 million tires.221 In response, Congress
passed the Transportation, Recall, Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation
Act222 in 2000, which included a provision requiring the DOT to issue a rule
establishing warning systems for under-inflated tires.223 OMB issued a “return” letter
opposing the proposed rule establishing a four-tire warning system and urging the
agency to ignore the focused Congressional mandate in favor of a rule based on
“overall vehicle safety” concerns.224 OMB believed that a weaker standard than the
“four tire” monitoring option the DOT proposed would save more lives, because it
would encourage use of anti-lock brakes.225 The DOT’s National Highway and
Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the assumption
that laxer standards would translate into more anti-lock brakes or that anti-lock
brakes could be shown to save lives.226 This difference in engineering judgment and
predictions about indirect responses to regulatory requirements produced different
conclusions about costs and benefits.227 NHTSA has much more expertise in judging
the safety effects of braking systems and predicting automobile industry responses to
regulation than OMB. Yet, under pressure from OMB, DOT omitted the proposed
stricter standard that OMB had rejected from its final rule and adopted a less stringent

221

Mineta, 340 F.3d at 43.

222

Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 13, 114 Stat. 1800, 1806 (2000), reprinted in, 49 U.S.C. §
30123 note (2003).
223

Id. at 43-44.

224

Letter from John D. Graham, Director, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, OMB, to Kirk K. Van Tine, Office of General Counsel, Department of
Transportation
(February
12,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return/dot_revised_tire_rtnltr.pdf.
225

See id.

226

Mineta, 340 F.3d at 50.

227

See OMB, supra note 210, at 11 (asserting that the Tire Pressure Monitoring Rule
(TPMS) had negative net benefits of $706 to $862 million per year).
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option.228 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
approach that DOT adopted at the behest of OMB as contrary to the statute and
unreasonable, because the record showed that a stricter standard would not only
prevent more injuries and save more lives, but also be more cost effective than the
laxer standard DOT adopted.229
The two other cases where OMB disagreed with an agency conclusion that
benefits exceeded costs involved disputes about which of several plausible benefits
estimates to accept, rather than an OMB claim that benefits were trivial. Thus, these
were not cases where OMB concluded that the agency was demanding lavish
expenditures upon trivial risks. For example, in the rule regulating stormwater
runoff, EPA estimated the cost of its preferred option at $2.46 billion.230 Benefit
estimates developed during the rulemaking ranged from $610 million to $30.6 billion
for the handful of benefits that could be monetized.231 EPA’s consultant, Eastern
Research Group, ultimately concluded that the “best estimate” of this tiny subset of
benefits was between $3.2 billion and $5 billion, which would support a conclusion
that the monetized benefits alone outweighed all the costs.232 EPA, however, was
unable to quantify and monetize many significant benefits that it believed its draft
rule would provide. The non-quantified benefits included the value of improved
recreation on water bodies (such as from keeping beaches open), the improvements in
biodiversity, and the health benefits from reduced bacterial contamination; in short,
many of the most important benefits from the rule.233 Because of difficulties in
correlating a particular industry’s activities to specific harms, which vary depending
local water quality conditions, EPA was reduced to relying solely upon estimates of
the monetized value of avoided dredging and water storage and treatment costs.

228

Id. at 50-51.

229

Mineta, 340 F.3d at 42.

230
Nancy Stoner and Robin Greenwald, Comments of the Natural Resources Defense
Council and the Waterkeeper Alliance on EPA’s Proposed Effluent Guidelines and
Standards for the Construction and Development Category 24 (December 22, 2002) (citing
docket materials) (on file with the author).
231

See Frank Ackerman, Uses and Abuses of Economic Analysis in Setting
Stormwater Regulations, 5 (December 18, 2002) (available in rulemaking docket and on
file with the author).
232

233

Id. at 6.

See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED EFFLUENT LIMITATION GUIDELINES AND
NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 7-1 - 7-11 (May, 2002).
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Thus, the emphasis on monetized benefits diverted attention from the rule’s most
important benefits.234
OMB argued for a lower estimate of monetized benefits than EPA’s
consultant suggested, even though the consultant’s suggestion lay near the bottom of
the plausible range.235 OMB also apparently did not find the significant nonquantified benefits important. This difference in views about which value to choose
for the monetized benefits and whether non-quantified benefits deserved any weight,
not a suggestion that the benefits were trivial, largely explains the cost-benefit-based
portion of the dispute between OMB and EPA on this rule.236
The other rule that generated a similar dispute about whether benefits
exceeded costs, a rule for regulating sports airplanes, involved much less costs and
much less monetized benefits.237 Nevertheless, it would be hard to argue that
avoiding some of the 51 deaths in sport airplane accidents that motivated this rule
would constitute a trivial benefit.238
This data set also contradicts the assumption of regulatory reformers that
regulatory review primarily discourages expensive rules generating trivial benefits in
another way. Most regulatory review focuses on economically insignificant rules, i.e.
rules costing less than $100 million a year.239
234

See Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the
Construction and Development Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 42644, 42674-75 (Proposed June
24, 2002).
235
Ackerman, supra note 231, at 5 (OMB argued for a lower estimate than the $1.13
billion originally estimated by EPA, which involved a miscalculation understating
benefits).
236

OMB also objected to this rule on federalism grounds. See OMB, supra note 23,
at 107 (because “the . . . ecological impacts . . . are largely local in nature, EPA ultimately
decided to work with State and local governments . . .” instead of promulgating fresh
regulations). OMB has objected to other rules on federalism grounds in the past. See, e.g.,
New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1140-50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (OMB opposed
requirements that municipal waste combustors separate out recyclable materials and avoid
burning batteries in part on federalism grounds).
237
The FAA estimated the benefits at $63 million over 10 years. Certification of
Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft, 67 Fed. Reg. 5368, 5396
(Proposed February 5, 2002). It estimated the monetized benefits of avoided death alone,
valued at only $2.7 million per year, as greatly exceeding this cost. See id. at 5397-99.
238

239

See id. at 5397 (51 fatalities occurred in light-sport aircraft between 1995 and 2001)

While the executive order emphasizes review of rules costing more than $100
million, it also authorizes review of on a variety of ill-defined grounds that open the doors
to just about anything. See E.O. 12,866, § 3(f), § 6(b)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993). It
defines as significant actions subject to OMB review rules that have a material adverse
impact upon the economy, productivity, competition , jobs, the environment, public health
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OMB's Emphasis on Economically Insignificant Rules: 2002-2003

Rules Reviewed

Significant Rules240

Insignificant Rules

14

71

Significant Changes Sought
5
20
GAO found that OMB reviewed 71 economically insignificant rules, but only 14
economically significant ones from the data it examined. Indeed, the economic
triviality of some of the rules OMB saw fit to try and weaken is striking. It sought to
weaken rules consolidating state emissions reporting requirements,241 charging fees to
support government testing of vehicle emissions,242 and establishing an administrative
prerequisite for FAA certification of foreign aircraft repair stations243. Because of
OMB’s focus on economically insignificant rules, OMB sought significant changes in
twenty economically insignificant rules and only five economically significant
ones.244 While the percentage of economically important rules that OMB changed
significantly was slightly higher than the percentage of economically unimportant
rules, GAO found this difference statistically insignificant.245 The hypothesis that

or safety, or State, local or tribal governments. Id. § 3(f)(1). Rules that have no negative
economic impact but interfere with another agency’s planned action also constitute
significant reviewable rules. Id. § 3(f)(2). Rules materially altering entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs fall within the order’s perview as well. Id. § 3(f)(3). And
finally, the Executive Order contains a very broad catch all category for rules raising novel
legal or policy issues (which arguably almost any rule does). Id. § 3(f)(4).
240

This refers to economically significant rules, those costing $100 million per year
or more.
241

See Consolidated Emissions Reporting, 67 Fed. Reg. 39602 (June 10, 2002).

242

See Motor Vehicle and Engine Compliance Program Fees for: Light-Duty Vehicles;
Light-Duty Trucks; Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Engines; Nonroad Engines; and
Motorcycles, 67 Fed. Reg. 51402, 51413-15 (August 7, 2002).
243
See Letter From Donald R. Arbuckle, Deputy Administrator, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs to Rosalind A. Knapp, General Counsel, Department of
Transportation, July 20, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
return/faa_repair_stations_rtnltr-dot.html. In this case, the FAA ultimately convinced
OMB to accept the requirement it had focused much of its attention upon initially. See
Repair Stations, 66 Fed. Reg. 41088, 41095 (August 6, 2001) (promulgating the
requirement that foreign repair stations demonstrate that FAA-regulated aircraft need their
services in order to obtain FAA certification).
244

GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 83.

245

ID.
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OMB-administered CBA serves primarily to reign in very expensive rules addressing
trivial risks is inconsistent with the facts, which demonstrate more review and more
change of economically insignificant rules than of significant ones and no rules aimed
at trivial risks.246
The demand for CBA also sometimes led to OMB opposition to regulation
where an agency could not quantify the benefits of its proposals. In 19 of the 25 rules
reviewed, the agencies were unable to monetize any of the proposals’ benefits prior to
OMB review.247
Basis for OMB Review
Completed Agency CBA

6 Cases

Inability to Monetize or Other Reasons
19 Cases
The agencies had legitimate reasons for this. For example, EPA could not quantify
the benefits of reductions of nitrogen oxide emissions from large ships. Nitrogen
oxide is a precursor to particulate pollution (associated with tens of thousands of
deaths annually in the United States) and ozone (exacerbating millions of asthma
cases), so there is reason to believe that stringent standards for ships could deliver
substantial benefits. But EPA did not have adequate port-specific emission
inventories, which would be necessary to correlate emissions with specific regional
health impacts to quantify those benefits.248 Yet, a demand for CBA makes rules that
would meet applicable statutory criteria suspect at OMB, just because the benefits
resist quantification.

246

The focus on the economically insignificant flagged in the GAO report did not
involve an anomaly. During the subsequent period from October 1, 2002 to September 30,
2003, OMB reviewed 349 final rules, of which only 37, approximately 11 percent, were
economically significant. OMB 2004, supra note 23, at 6-7. Of these major rules, 25
implemented federal budgetary programs. Id. Only twelve involved social regulations
generating new costs and benefits. Id.
247

Similar patterns have prevailed in the past. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic
Analysis of Regulation: A Response to Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2004)
(noting that agencies only monetized benefits in 26% of all regulations from 1981 to 1996).
Since Hahn’s statistic applies to all regulations, not just difficult to quantify environmental
regulations, his statistic suggests very little monetization of environmental benefits.
248

See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New Marine Compression-Ignition
Engines At or Above 30 Liters/Cylinder, 67 Fed. Reg. 37548, 37586 (Proposed May 29,
2002). Note that no inventory could be stable, because ships move from port to port.
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Often, OMB sought significant changes in rules that had little to do with CBA
or even the lack of it.249 For example, OMB suggested that the Department of
Agriculture reduce indemnity payments designed to encourage owners of deer and elk
herds infected with a variant of “mad cow” disease to destroy the sick animals and
disinfect the premises.250 Since this rule sets a transfer fee, it generates no societal
cost (administrative cost aside)251 and the record does not disclose any demand for
CBA. Yet, OMB increased risks to public safety by encouraging the Department of
Agriculture to lower payments designed to encourage owners to take actions
preventing the spread of this disease.252 OMB’s tendency to disfavor health
protective measures even when it has no CBA-based objections to a rule is consistent
with OMB’s past practice.253 While some OMB review may not be germane to the
question of CBA’s neutrality, the consistent direction of rules changed based, at least
in part, on CBA or the lack of it, suggest that CBA performs the function of
weakening protection of health, safety, and the environment. It does so not only by
demanding frequently impossible quantification, but by creating an ideological
justification for wide-ranging review based on policy preferences of OMB
economists.
c. Putting this Data in Context - While OMB sought to reduce the
benefits and burdens of the rules in this data set, one should put this data set in
context. The GAO concluded that the formal review process did not significantly
change most of the rules it reviewed from safety, health, and environmental
agencies.254 Yet, it significantly changed 6 of 8 rules proposed by EPA’s office of
water, 7 of 14 from EPA’s office of air and radiation and 1 or 4 rules from the its

249

This phenomenon has been observed in the operation of Presidential review in
previous administrations. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of
Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARKANSAS L.
REV. 161, 170-71 (1995) (discussing the Council on Competitiveness’ support for gutting
operating permit rules under the Clean Air Act).
250
See Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids; Payment of Indemnity, 67 Fed. Reg. 5925,
5927-28 (February 8, 2002); GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 139 (OMB suggested that the
indemnity be capped at 95% of the animal’s value).
251

See Posner, supra note 43, at 1069.

252

Cervid Indemnity Payments, 67 Fed. Reg. at 5927-28.

253

See O’Brien, supra note 71, at 60 (during the first Bush administration, OMB
review “focused primarily on political and policy issues” and CBA was “rarely
mentioned”).
254

GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 69 (finding significant changes in 25 of the 85 rules
reviewed during the study period).
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solid waste office.255 So formal OMB review leaves some rules unchanged, but has a
disproportionate impact on EPA’s most active programs.
While some of the rules left unaffected may be weak or deregulatory, there is
at least one case of Dr. Graham’s OMB supporting a very stringent rule. EPA
finalized standards regulating non-road diesel emissions in June of 2004.256 These
standards promise to greatly reduce emissions of nitrogen oxide, sulfur, particulate,
and non-methane hydrocarbons.257 Together they address a very significant source of
particulate emissions, ground level ozone, acid rain, and hazardous air pollutants
(associated with cancer, birth defects and other serious risks).258 EPA estimated that
the monetized benefits (which understate total benefits substantially) from this rule
would equal approximately $80 billion per year, whereas monetized costs would
equal about $2 billion per year.259 EPA expected this rule to prevent more 12,000
premature deaths, 8,900 hospitalizations (mostly asthma related), 15,000 nonfatal
heart attacks, and approximately one million days of missed work from respiratory
ailments.260
EPA involved OMB in a joint effort at creating a CBA early on in the
rulemaking process.261 And EPA reports that OMB was supportive of the agency’s
proposal. In spite of the great disparity of costs and benefits, there is no evidence that
OMB pushed EPA to promulgate a more stringent rule than the rule it ultimately
adopted. OMB, however, did use this occasion to try and establish precedent for
valuation methodologies that would shrink the dollar value of saving lives in future
cost-benefit calculations.262 Still, this rule shows that OMB will sometimes support
strict rules when monetized benefits exceed costs by an enormous margin.

255

Id. at 75.

256

Control of Emissions from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed. Reg. 38958
(June 29, 2004) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 9, 69 et al.)
257

Id. at 38958.

258

Id. at 38962-68 (discussing the health impacts of the regulated diesel emissions in

detail).
259

Id. at 38958.

260

Id. at 38958, 38960; OMB, supra note 23, at 108.

261

OMB, supra note 23, at 108; GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 37.

262

See Laura J. Lowenstein and Richard L. Revesz, Anti-Regulation Under the Guise
of Rational Regulation: The Bush Administration’s Approaches to Valuing Human Lives
in Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis, 34 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt. L. Inst.) 10954, 10957
(2004).
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Nevertheless, the data examined above suggest that CBA functions as a oneway ratchet in the formal regulatory review process. This ratchet often weakens
regulation (even regulation with favorable cost-benefit ratios) and sometimes stands
still, allowing agencies to keep their rules in tact (as in the non-road diesel rule
example). But during the period examined, this ratchet never moved in the direction
of encouraging more stringent regulation than the agency would adopt on its own,
even when benefits far outweighed costs.
2. Prompt Letters - During the second Bush Administration, OMB
began issuing “prompt letters”, which its press release describes as “encouraging life
saving actions by regulators.”263 Professor Sunstein, echoing the press release, has
cited the use of these letters as evidence that CBA sometimes encourages the
“initiation” of regulation, not just its evisceration.264 If the prompt letters came about
as a result of CBA and the letters catalyzed fresh environmental, health, or safety
regulations, they would constitute evidence of CBA’s neutrality.265

263

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NEWS RELEASE, OMB ENCOURAGES
LIFESAVING ACTIONS BY REGULATORS, September 18, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress /2001-35.html (last visited April 27, 2004).
264

265

See SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 1, at 26.

Cf. John F. Morrall, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 221, 233 (2003) (citing regulatory opportunities addressed in some of the
“prompt letters” as examples of cost effective ideas for “further regulation.”).
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While two of the OMB prompt letters rely upon at least a very rough CBA266,
most of the prompt letters sent do not monetize costs and benefits,267 even through a

266

See Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to John Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor (September 18,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress /osha_prompt_letter.html
(last visited April 27, 2004) [hereinafter Defibrillator Letter] (relying on CBA finding that
defibrillators in air carriers generated $25.2 in annual benefits for $2.4 in annual costs to
suggest that defibrillators in the workplace would probably pass a cost-benefit test); Letter
from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA to Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health
and Human Services (September 18, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress /hhs_prompt_letter.html [hereinafter Transfats
Labeling Letter] (providing an estimate of the costs and benefits of labeling requirements
for transfats based on the Food and Drug Administrations regulatory impact analysis). See
also Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, to Michael J. Jackson, Deputy
Secretary, Department of Transportation (December 7, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/nhtsa_prompt120701.html (last visited, June 10,
2004) [hereinafter Crash Test Letter] (estimating cost of improving vehicles but not
monetizing benefits).
267
See Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA to Christine Todd Whitman,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (December 4, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/epa_pm_research_prompt120401.html (last
visited April 27, 2004) [Particulate Research Letter] (urging EPA to focus its research on
particulate matter on industry research priorities); Letter from John D. Graham,
Administrator, OIRA to Kim T. Nelson, Assistant Administrator, Office of Environmental
Information, United States Environmental Protection Agency, March 4, 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/epa_pm_research_prompt120401.html
[hereinafter TRI Letter] (urging EPA to improve the utility of Toxic Release Inventory data
in various ways); Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA to Armando Falcon,
Jr., Director Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
prompt_ofheo052902.html (last visited, April 27, 2004) [hereinafter Fannie Mae Letter]
(urging imposition of stricter disclosure requirements on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
without any statements regarding costs and benefits); Letter from John D. Graham,
Administrator, OIRA to Judge Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and
Parks, Department of Interior (August 21, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt/doi_mapping_prompt.pdf (last visited on
June 10, 2004) [hereinafter Habitat Mapping Letter] (urging integration of mapping data
that might help regulated parties comply with regulations under the Endangered Species
Act, with no CBA); Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA to Mary Hutzler,
Director, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Energy Information
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy (February 24, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt-ltr_eia.pdf (last visited, June 10, 2004)
[hereinafter Energy Forecasting Letter] (raising a concern about modeling assumptions in
DOE energy forecasts, without any reference to CBA); Letter from John D. Graham,
Administrator, OIRA to Claude A. Allen, Deputy Secretary, Department of Health and
Human Services & James R. Mosely, Deputy Secretary, Department of Agriculture, (May
27, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_dietary_052703.pdf [hereinafter Dietary
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back of the envelope calculation. So most of them have nothing to do with CBA.
None of the prompt letters addressing environmental, health, and safety
regulation sought to initiate fresh regulation.268 One of the letters that uses some
CBA simply supports ongoing rulemaking that the FDA had already initiated to label
transfats in foods, as even OMB’s press release acknowledges.269 The second letter
that relied on back of the envelope CBA did not clearly support any regulation. OMB
called on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to “promote”
placement of defibrillators in work place through “information, economic incentives,
voluntary agreement” or, last and apparently least, “compulsory regulation.”270 Thus,
OMB did not squarely urge the adoption of a regulation, but mentioned this as a
possible response. OSHA responded to this signal by deciding to “promote”
defibrillators through an information program encouraging employers to voluntarily
place them in a workplace, without requiring them to do so.271 A third letter contains

Guidelines Letter] (urging revisions in dietary guidelines, with no reference to costs and
not monetization of benefits); Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA to Mark
E. Ray, Office of the Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Department of Agri c u l t u r e , N o v e mb e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , a v a i l a b l e at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt-ltr_env_qual_incent_prog.pdf (last visited
on June 10, 2004) [hereinafter Agriculture Letter] (urging USDA to target conservation
funding at efforts likely to address water quality, air quality, wetlands, and wildlife habitat,
with no CBA).
268

Indeed, only one letter appeared on its face to be calling for any fresh regulation.
This letter asked the agency overseeing the federal lending agencies, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, to subject them to the same mandatory disclosure requirements that apply to
private companies. See Fannie Mae Letter, supra note 267, at 2. OMB, in its report to
Congress listed a “prompt letter” to EPA on nonroad diesel emissions. See OMB, supra
note 210, at 186. This seems to be either a mistake or an exaggeration. The report lists a
prompt letter of June 7, 2002, but OMB’s website contains no prompt letter, but instead a
press release announcing a joint collaboration on a nonroad diesel rule with EPA. See
EPA, EPA AND OMB WORKING TO SPEED THE REDUCTION OF POLLUTION FROM NONROAD
DIESEL
ENGINES
(June
7,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/r-117.pdf [hereinafter, DIESEL PRESS RELEASE].
This document does not suggest that the rule was an OMB initiative.
269
See Transfats Labeling Letter, supra note 266 (supporting FDA’s proposed rule an
transfats labeling); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NEWS RELEASE, supra note 263,
(characterizing its transfats prompt letter as urging “acceleration of an ongoing
rulemaking”). The Tranfats Labeling Letter did not, however, urge acceleration of FDA
rulemaking, but instead urged FDA to “carefully” review public comments and, “if
appropriate, proceed to final rulemaking.” Tranfats Labeling Letter, supra note 266, at 1.
270

271

See Defibrillators Letter, supra note 266.

Letter from John L. Henshaw, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and
Health, Department of Labor to John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA, May 4, 2004,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt/dol_aeds_update.pdf
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no CBA, but speculates that the benefits of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration requiring a high speed frontal offset crash test might well
substantially outweigh the costs.272 The letter urging NHTSA to give this rulemaking
priority acknowledges that this rule is already on NHTSA’s regulatory agenda.273
Hence, this third letter neither initiated a new regulation or regulatory requirement,
nor reflected a response to CBA.274
The overwhelming majority of the prompt letters endorsed ongoing agency
efforts to improve disclosure and use of information.275 The crash test letter was the
only one to call on an agency to even continue an ongoing effort to require corporate

(announcing completion of a flyer on Defibrillators and discussing further voluntary
efforts); OMB 2004, supra note 17, at 113.
272

See Crash Test Letter, supra note 266 (“. . . I suspect that the benefits” of a frontal
offset crash test “could substantially exceed its costs.”)
273

See GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 49.

274

Furthermore, this letter hardly signals unequivocal support for offset crash tests.
It asks NHTSA to meet a gauntlet of analytical and procedural requirements in developing
this rule. It proposes increment CBA for each regulatory option, consideration of
“disbenefits” from side impacts (and other impacts), and burdensome peer review of the
CBA. See Crash Test Letter, supra note 266. Some evidence exists that NHTSA may have
taken the gauntlet more seriously than the equivocal support for an offset crash test. See
OMB Watch, NHTSA Changes Strategy from Safety Features to Crash Prevention, 5 THE
W A T C H E R
N o .
1 5
( 2 0 0 4 ) ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/2309/1/227 (citing remarks by NHTSA
Administrator Jeffrey Runge that suggest an abandonment of the whole idea of further
modifications of the design of vehicles to protect occupants from a crash). Furthermore,
by 2005, most manufacturers already conducted such a test, because of regulatory
requirements abroad. See OMB Watch, White House Advances Anti-Regulatory Hit List,
O M B
W A T C H E R
n o .
1 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
6
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/2607/1/311http://www.ombwatch.org/arti
cle/articleview/2607/1/311.
275

See Particulate Research Letter, supra note 267 (supporting EPA research aimed
at pinpointing sources of health damage from particulate air pollution); Transfats Labeling
Letter, supra note 266 (supporting FDA proposal to require disclosure of transfats content
of food); TRI Letter, supra note 267 (urging improvements in Toxic Release Inventory
reporting of pollution); Energy Forecasting Letter, supra note 267 (urging DOE to change
assumptions used in energy use forecasting for transportation in ways that would indicate
less of a need for corporate average fuel economy standards); Dietary Guidelines Letter,
supra note 267 (supporting revisions to information provided consumers about healthy
diets); Habitat Mapping Letter, supra note 267 (supporting increasing availability of
mapping data useful for private compliance with the Endangered Species Act); Fannie Mae
Letter, supra note 267 (supporting strengthening disclosure requirements applicable to
federal agencies making housing loans).
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conduct changes that actually directly reduce risks.276 And no letter urged an agency
to make a rule more stringent or to adopt a rule not already on the agency’s agenda.
3. Hit Lists By contrast with the handful of prompt letters seeking to support
some ongoing regulatory efforts, OMB has sought nominations of specific regulations
that would result in “reductions in regulatory burden.”277 By contrast with the paltry
number of “prompt letters” ostensibly aimed at enhancing regulatory benefits, the
most recent iteration of this nomination process (OMB has done this several times
under George W. Bush)278 has produced a list of 189 regulatory reform

276

See Crash Test Letter, supra note 266.

277

OMB 2004, supra note 17, at 58.

278

Id. at 150. In 2001 and 2002, OMB’s phrased its solicitation for reform
recommendations more neutrally than in 2004. See Id. at 151; Draft Report to Congress
on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 22041, 22054 (May 2,
2001) (reforms sought that increase net benefits); GAO 2003, supra note 52, at (2002
solicitation asked for not just recision of rules and modifications, but also new rules). The
nomination processes in 2001 and 2002 produced 392 suggestions. OMB 2004, supra note
17, at 150-51. In spite of the neutral phrasing, the overwhelming majority of these
suggestions appear aimed at reducing regulatory burdens at the expense of public health,
safety, and the environment, rather than increasing health, environmental, and safety
protection at the expense of regulated parties. In the original batch of 71 nominations in
2001, the anti-regulatory Mercatus Center nominated 44 of the candidate regulations.
GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 103. Most of the some 300 regulatory reform
recommendations made in response to the 2002 solicitation involved rescinding rules or
increasing regulatory flexibility, but more than a quarter involved increases of stringency.
Id. at 109.
OMB’s top priority reforms in conduct regulation from the 2001 nominations in health,
environmental, and safety area all involved deregulation. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES, 65, 68, 71, 72, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100-103, 113, 115-17. Cf. id. at 70
(food labeling recommendation given high priority). In response to criticism of the 2001
process, in 2002 OMB had the agencies, rather than OMB, review the nominations that
seemed to involve fresh initiatives in order for the agencies to determine priorities. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 21-22 (2003) (over 100 suggestions were not fresh
initiatives, but the others were referred to the agencies). This process produced a little
more balance than existed in 2001 or would seem likely from the 2004 process, i.e. some
regulatory initiatives mixed in with the large number of deregulatory proposals. See, e.g.,
id. at 26 (salmonella performance standards pursued); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: SUMMARIES OF PUBLIC SUGGESTIONS FOR
REFORM OF REGULATION AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 7 (2002) (showing that this proposal
emanated from pro-safety groups and sought to solve an enforcement problem created by
a Fifth Circuit judicial decision).
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recommendations, which OMB has directed the agencies to review.279 The sheer
number of these anti-regulatory prompts dwarfs the number of somewhat proregulatory prompts. The 181 recommendations include 93 recommendations for
changes in EPA rules, all but two of which came from industry or pro-industry
groups.280
D. Some Conclusions about Neutrality in Practice
This history shows that when CBA has any impact at all, its proponents within
the government almost invariably use it to weaken environmental regulation. With
respect to cost-benefit criteria (as contrasted with the “indeterminate position”), this
conclusion is way too mild. Cost-benefit tests have not weakened regulation, they
have largely stymied it altogether. That conclusion alone is extremely significant,
because CBA proponents often advocate its use as a test for government regulation.
With respect to the history of CBA’s use without a statutory cost-benefit test
being in place, i.e. as a manifestation of the “indeterminate position”, weakening
regulation remains an extremely frequent outcome and strengthening regulation a
very rare anomaly. CBA becomes a second hurdle that regulation must pass after
meeting other statutory criteria that usually weed out some candidate regulations.
Sometimes regulation passes this test, as the off-road diesel engine rule suggests. But
even in those cases, the need to conduct CBA often slows down the rule and ends up
increasing environmental harms for that reason. Environmental regulators almost
never use CBA to strengthen regulation, to make it stricter than it would otherwise
be. With the single exception of lead from small refineries, CBA has functioned as a
one-way ratchet, able to stand still to be sure, but only capable of moving in one
direction when it does function as a tool having some substantive effect, that of
making regulation less stringent. CBA has not been neutral in the sense of having a
neutral effect upon regulation.
This conclusion, of course, does not settle the question of whether CBA has a
positive value. Some might argue that environmental regulation rarely needs
strengthening, so that this lack of neutrality constitutes a virtue.281 But most

279
OMB 2004, supra note 17, at 58. OMB has indicated an intention to review
“regulatory reform priorities,” presumably from among these suggestions, but only after
the agencies have devoted resources to reviewing “each” of the 189 suggestions. Id. at 58.
280

ID. at 64-85. The two suggestions that did not come from a pro-industry group
came from animal rights groups, which might share an industry interest avoiding animal
testing of potential carcinogens. See ID. at 81-82.
281

Harvard Professor (now Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer has argued that
agencies suffer from “tunnel vision,” which makes them pursue stringent regulation to the
point of being counterproductive. See BREYER, supra note 281, at 10-11. While Breyer
himself suggests that agencies sometimes need to be more stringent, ID. at 23, those who
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proponents of CBA have portrayed it as a neutral rationalizing reform.
Morgenstern’s book, for example, argues that economic analysis has decreased the
cost and increased the benefits of regulation282, which makes CBA appear neutral and
clearly beneficial. This claim, however, could be made about any arbitrary change in
regulation. All significant changes in regulation either reduce the cost or increase the
benefits. Unfortunately, an analyst could state, with equal accuracy, that almost all of
the changes Morgenstern discusses reduce the benefits of regulation or increase its
cost. For the changes that reduced the cost of regulation generally reduced its
benefits and the change, the phase-down of lead, which increased a rule’s benefits,
also increased the regulated industry’s cost.283 CBA’s lack of neutrality in practice
might not condemn it in the eyes of opponents of government standards, but it calls
into question a major argument made on its behalf.
III. IS CBA NEUTRAL IN THEORY?
Even though CBA has proven anti-environmental in practice, it might be
neutral in theory. A finding that CBA has functioned in a biased fashion in the
regulatory process might reflect the biases of those administering CBA, rather than an
inherent feature of CBA.284 If so, those seeking neutrality through CBA may wish to
change the people administering CBA, rather than abandon the technique.
The distinction between the indeterminate position and a cost-benefit criterion
will prove helpful here. For these two ideas about how CBA should influence
decision-making have theoretically different effects on regulatory practice. They
therefore differ somewhat in their implications for the neutrality of CBA.

agree that detrimental tunnel vision pervades regulatory decision-making might think that
no spur to stricter regulation is ever needed.
282

MORGENSTERN, supra note 68, at 456-59.

283

See MCGARTIY, supra note 1, at 32 (showing that costs escalate for refiners as
limits on lead get tighter). Moreover, nobody needs CBA to identify the opportunities to
reduce costs without reducing benefits. These opportunities primarily involve use of
emissions trading, which allows polluters to pay others to make extra emission reductions
in their stead. See Richard Morgenstern, supra note 68, at 458 (listing trading as a cost
reducing reform in the leaded gasoline and ozone depletion rules). This trading around of
obligations reduces the cost of regulation without reducing benefits when the monitoring
is good and the rules prohibit gaming. Cf. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an
Economic Incentive Program: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive
Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 317 n. 131 (1998) (trading slowed achievement
of the lead rule’s goal, partly because of monitoring defects). CBA is neither necessary
nor helpful in identifying opportunities to employ emissions trading productively.
284

Cf. Buzbee, supra note 8, at 353 (suggesting that CBA empowers economists who
are hostile to stringent regulation “by virtue of their training or politics.”)
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A. The Indeterminate Position
The indeterminate position, like any other vague position, influences the
decisions to which it applies unpredictably. It may appear to have neutral effect,
because any vapid position seems neutral. Since the indeterminate position does not
spell out how administrative agencies should respond to CBA, it does hot have a
theoretically predictable influence upon substance. Administrators may ignore the
analysis, use it to justify more stringent regulation, or use it to justify less stringent
regulation.285 In theory, all of these possibilities exist. And they exist regardless of
what any particular analysis shows.
The concept of an indeterminate position calls attention to a very basic aspect
of the regulatory reform debate that receives insufficient attention. CBA by itself is a
type of analysis, not a principal, neutral or otherwise. I have argued elsewhere that
regulators should choose the simplest type of analysis that adequately informs correct
application of the statutory criterion governing an administrative decision.286 This
would imply that government agencies should employ CBA when a cost-benefit
criterion governs the decision, but not otherwise. But the main point here is simple:
CBA may appear neutral in some respects (because of its lack of content), but it is not
a principle.
This apparent neutrality, however, disappears if the effect of devoting
resources to the analysis is taken into account. In theory, CBA requires more
resources than competing forms of analysis. Health-based regulation, for example,
requires assessment of health effects, but often does not require consideration of cost
or monetization of benefits. By contrast, technology-based regulation requires the
assessment of technological possibilities and their cost. Cost-benefit analysis
combines all of the difficulties of both of these forms of analysis and creates an
additional complication - it requires quantification of benefits and, whenever
possible, the assignment of monetary values to each of those benefits.287
These greater resource requirements point to slower regulation per dollar of
government expenditure, thereby decreasing the efficiency of the standard-setting
process. Unless Congress augments resources to carry out regulatory analysis, this
inefficiency will delay regulation.288 These delays have two theoretical implications.
First, those exposed to hazards must remain exposed longer, and therefore are more
285

See generally Buzbee, supra note 8, at 349 (proposals to add CBA would broaden
the discretion of administrative agencies).
286

Driesen, supra note 11, at 82 (stating that analysis should focus on factors the legal
criterion governing a decision make relevant).
287

288

See Driesen, supra note 13 at 10019 n. 204.

Cf. Buzbee, supra note 8, at 352-53 (the claim that regulatory reform bills requiring
judicially reviewable CBA “would lead to regulatory paralysis” is “surely correct.”)
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likely to suffer death, injuries, or other ill effects that prompt regulatory standards
might otherwise help them avoid. Second, delays in standard-setting allow
postponement of compliance expenditures, and thereby increase the wealth of
regulated firms. This outcome favors regulated firms and their customers over those
facing hazards the regulations aim to prevent. This delay favors economic values
over environmental and health protection. In this sense, the indeterminate position,
though apparently vapid in terms of substantive direction, is not neutral in its effect.
B. Cost-Benefit Criteria
A cost-benefit criterion has the same non-neutral effects upon the pace of
regulation as the indeterminate position. But it also should influence actual decisions
about the stringency of standards in a theoretically predictable way.289 The precise
effect, however, depends upon the choice among several possible cost-benefit
criteria.
1. The No Excess Cost Requirement - The most common criterion that
regulatory reformers recommend stipulates that regulatory costs may not exceed
regulatory benefits.290 I shall refer to this as the “No Excess Cost Requirement.”
Sometimes advocates of CBA propose this formulation as a presumption, but at other
times they propose it as a more absolute criterion.291 They also sometimes advocate a
less demanding variant upon the No Excess Cost Requirement, that costs should not
grossly exceed benefits.292 It will prove useful to analyze a simple No Excess Cost
Requirement and then to note how these variants might influence the analysis.
The No Excess Cost Requirement constitutes a one-way ratchet,
systematically reducing the stringency of regulation in all cases where it has any
influence at all. To see this, let us assume that an agency estimates that a regulation
demanding a 50% reduction in some pollutant generates $1 million in compliance
expenditures, but only $700,000 in benefits. Here the costs exceed the benefits and
the No Excess Costs Requirement requires the agency seeing this analysis to reject
the regulation demanding a 50% reduction. Usually, however, marginal regulatory
costs decline rapidly as regulation becomes less stringent. Assuming that the
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In practice, this predictability probably does not exist, because too many judgment
calls are required in estimating benefits. See id. at 369-371 (explaining that CBA relies on
non-transparent political judgments).
290

See e.g., Executive Order 12, 291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
note (requiring that the costs of regulation not exceed its benefits to the extent permitted
by law). The order was signed on February 17, 1981.
291

Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1498-99 (articulating this position as a
presumption).
292

See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 119-120
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marginal value of regulatory benefits remains constant regardless of the degree of
stringency, the cost-benefit ratio will improve as the regulation becomes less stringent
and get worse as it gets more stringent. This means that even when a proposed
regulation flunks this cost-benefit test, a less stringent regulation may well pass. For
example, if we assume that a 5% reduction generates $10,000 in compliance cost and
$100,000 worth of benefits, the agency can promulgate a regulation requiring a 5%
reduction, even though it cannot, consistent with the No Excess Cost criterion require
50% reduction. Thus, this cost-benefit criterion requires a reduction in stringency.
This cost-benefit criterion, however, never requires an increase in stringency.
Continuing with our example, imagine that a 40% pollution reduction would produce
$500,000 in compliance expenditures and $600,000 worth of benefits. This produces
a more health protective outcome than the 5% reduction. Both the 40% reduction and
the 5% reduction pass this cost-benefit test, for they both generate benefits exceeding
cost. The No Excess Cost test, however, offers no guidance on which of these two
regulations to choose. It does not tell the regulatory to choose the more stringent
40% reduction option and would not dictate the choice of a more stringent limit under
any set of circumstances.
We could refine this requirement to better fit the way some economists think
about this, but this refinement would not change the analysis just offered. The
refinement would rephrase the No Excess Cost requirement to specify that the
marginal cost of the last unit of control cost should not exceed the marginal benefit
associated with that unit. This marginal test would usually produce different
outcomes than a test predicated upon average costs and benefits, but it would remain
true that this cost-benefit criterion acts like a one-way ratchet. Prohibiting the
marginal cost from exceeding the marginal benefit does not force regulators to seize
additional benefits when the marginal control cost proves less than the marginal
benefit.
The other variations on the requirement that costs not exceed benefits
described at the beginning of the section do not change this basic finding about
CBA’s lack of neutrality. The requirement that costs not grossly exceed benefits293
may permit more regulation than the requirement that costs may not exceed benefits
at all, but the no gross excess cost requirement (like the No Excess Cost requirement)
only reduces stringency, it never increases it. The requirement that costs must
presumably not exceed benefits applies in a non-neutral manner to weaken regulation,
but it allows the weakening to be overcome in some cases, such as where
distributional concerns are especially acute.294 Whatever factors overcome the
presumption in this case only reduce the number of cases in which the criterion
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Cf. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 37, at 44 (characterizing the standard
governing Consumer Product Safety Commission regulation as requiring a “reasonable
relationship between regulatory costs and benefits.”)
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See Driesen, supra note 11, at 59.
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relaxes stringency. But the presumptive test only ameliorates the test’s weakening of
regulation, it never acts affirmatively to strengthen (i.e. make more stringent)
regulation.
Regulatory reformers, including academic reformers who advocate CBA as a
neutral principle, normally advocate some variant of the No Excess Cost requirement.
It is simply wrong to imagine that such a requirement is neutral, even in theory.
This theory does help explain the findings from the history of OMB review
mentioned earlier. The Reagan executive order has sought to impose a No Excess
Cost requirement to the extent permitted by law.295 This might help explain why
OMB so consistently favored weakening environmental regulation in the Reagan
Administration, when it significantly affected the outcome of rules. The successor
order requires that the benefits justify the cost to the extent permitted by law.296 This
test is unclear, but amenable to interpretation as consistent with the No Excess Cost
requirement or one of its variants. The case studies provided suggest that George W.
Bush’s OMB has relied on a No Excess Cost requirement from the Clinton executive
order to reject some regulatory requirements.297
2. Cost Equaling Benefit - The regulatory reformers’ prescription is not as
biased as the economist’s concept of optimal pollution (or optimal safety) would be.
Economists typically describe optimal pollution as pollution regulated (or taxed) so
that the cost of pollution control equals the benefits of regulation.298 I will refer to a
legal criterion requiring that costs equal benefits as the Optimality Criterion.
The Optimality Criterion appears neutral in one sense. In principal, it could
move a regulatory agency either toward more stringent or less stringent regulation
than it initially proposed. Returning to our earlier example, neither the 5% reduction
nor the 50% reduction would satisfy the Optimality Criterion. The 5% reduction
flunks because it generates benefits in excess of cost. The 50% reduction flunks
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Section 2 of Executive Order 12,291 provides that “ . . all agencies to the extent
permitted by law shall. . adhere to the following requirements: . . . (b) Regulatory action
shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh
the potential costs to society.” Exec. Order 12866, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. § 601 note (Supp. 1996).
296

Id. § 1(b)(6).

297

These are the three cases where OMB disagreed with the agency’s conclusion that
costs exceed benefits. See infra notes 220-237 and accompanying text. Recall that in order
to reach this conclusion, OMB disagreed with agency analysis positing positive net benefits
and that in one of these three cases a court effectively reversed an agency decision
predicated on OMB’s analysis.
298

See I HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES, at 253-54 (2003) (defining the “social
optimum” regulation or tax as one that equates marginal abatement cost to marginal
damage).
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because it generates costs in excess of benefits. The Optimality criterion would force
the agency to choose an option in between these two.
This conclusion that an optimization criterion could move a regulator toward
more stringent or less stringent regulation would not shift if one specified that the
benefits and costs should equal each other at the margin. This Optimization Criterion
at the margin would still demand less stringent regulation than a regulation generating
marginal costs in excess of benefits and more stringent regulation that a regulation
generating marginal benefits in excess of marginal costs. Thus, the Optimality
Criterion, whether defined at the margin or on average, is not completely one-sided.
On the other hand, the notion of neutral effect in the regulatory reform
literature must be understood as a claim about the change cost-benefit analysis
produces relative to pre-existing baselines. This optimization criterion might not be
neutral relative to existing law. Some key provisions of existing statutes require full
protection of public health or the environment.299 Relative to such criteria, the
optimization criterion constitutes a relaxation of stringency. A regulation that sets
costs equal to benefits allows some serious harms to continue unabated. Whenever
the cost of reducing a portion of the regulated harm exceeded the monetary value
assigned that harm (the benefit of the regulation), the optimality requirement would
require that the regulator allow the harm to continue.300 The optimization criterion
contemplates allowing even the death of innocents, if the cost of avoiding those
deaths “outweighs” the dollar values economists assign to human life. This
optimization criterion would not make regulation that already fully protects human
health and the environment more stringent, but it would sometimes make it less
stringent, so it is certainly not neutral relative to a health-protective standard.
Most government standard setting in the environmental and occupational area,
however, relies on technology-based approaches that use the capabilities of
technology to determine standards. I have elsewhere developed the contours of the
“feasibility principle,” which provides a useful heuristic for considering many of
these sorts of regulations.301 Statutory provisions embodying the feasibility principle
require maximum protection of public health, safety, and the environment, unless
expenditures become so great that regulators expect widespread plant shutdowns.302
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See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(b), 7412(f)(2); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See
generally Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. ___(2005) (forthcoming).
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See Driesen, supra note 15, at 560-63 (explaining this point in detail).
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See Driesen, supra note 11, at 19. See also Amy Sinden, The Economics of
Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat
Designations, 28 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 129, 184-92 (2004) (discussing “short-cut”
standards, which consider cost without employing CBA).
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See Driesen, supra note 11, at 3.
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These provisions strongly encourage agencies to avoid widespread plant
shutdowns.303
While the Optimality Criterion is not neutral relative to the feasibility
principle, it’s quite different from it, and its direction cannot be predicted solely from
theory. A feasibility principle may well demand reductions that would generate costs
exceeding benefits, but not produce costs so onerous as to shut down plants. In that
case, the Optimality Criterion reduces stringency relative to the feasibility principle.
It is possible, however, that some regulations shutting down plants would still
produce costs equaling benefits. If this is true, than CBA would produce greater
stringency than the feasibility principle.304 The Optimality Criterion does not change
all outcomes under the feasibility principle in one predictable direction, and therefore
might be viewed as somewhat neutral relative to the feasibility principle, at least in
theory.305
While the question of whether the optimality principle is neutral in effect may
appear complex (at least in theory), it clearly is not value neutral. This criterion
involves a choice favoring economic efficiency over competing views of what
constitutes an appropriate criterion for good regulatory decisions. The health
protective statutory provisions favor a value choice that places human health above
economic considerations. The feasibility principle gives health primacy, except
where doing so might concentrate economic harms on workers victimized by plant
shutdowns.306 It implicitly rejects the notion that marginal differences in prices
matters much to human welfare, but accepts the notion that sudden elimination of
peoples’ income can provide a detriment comparable in importance to the experience
of loss of life or good health.307 Thus, selection of the Optimality Criterion involves a
non-neutral value choice.
While the optimization criterion has not figured prominently in the policy
debate about the regulatory reform literature, it has played a minor role in practice.
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Id.
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See Sunstein, Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 299, 312 (2001)(arguing that a cost-benefit “requirement” might be more protective
than a feasibility requirement in cases where the benefits outweighed the costs of shutting
down facilities); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L. J. 165, 232-33 (1999) (same).
305

Cf. Driesen, supra note 11, at 74-75 (pointing out that the notion that CBA would
lead regulators to shut plants appears unlikely).
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Id. at 35-38.
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The current executive order encourages agencies to “maximize net benefits.”308 John
Graham, the current director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) at OMB frequently invokes this principle in support of his opposition to
agency rules.309 But this criterion, in principle, has some potential to make rules
stricter.
The academic literature on net benefit maximization, including an
environmental economics textbook, understands this criterion as requiring agencies to
set costs equal to benefits at the margin, i.e. to conform to the Optimality Criterion
discussed above.310 The Optimality Criterion maximizes net benefits in the following
sense: When an agency writes regulations that generate costs exceeding benefits
(whether on average or at the margin), it makes the net benefits of regulation
negative. Setting costs equal to benefits addresses this problem.

308

Cf. Stewart, supra note 38, at 42 n. 61 (noting that the executive order does not
explain how to determine “net benefits.”). President Reagan’s earlier executive order,
12,291, contained similar requirements. It required, to the extent permitted by law agencies
to choose “regulatory objectives” that “maximize net benefits.” E.O. 12,291 § 2(c). It also
generally requires agencies to establish regulatory “priorities” maximizing net benefits.
Id. § 2(e). Some commentators have equated this second statement with an expectation that
the stringency of regulation would be set to maximize net benefits. See J. Lon Carlson,
John B. Braden, and David W. Martin, Implications of Executive Order 12,291 for
Discretion in Environmental Regulation, 12 B.C. ENVT’L AFF. L. REV. 313, 319 (1985).
Cf. David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory
Reform Debate, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 10003, 10014 (2001) (arguing that
priority setting should be defined in terms of the order of regulations and the content of the
regulatory agenda, rather than as a decisions about the stringency of a single regulation).
Also, when the first President Bush declared a moratorium on new regulation and asked
agencies to review existing regulation with an eye toward weakening them, he instructed
EPA to maximize net benefits. See Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 1278 (1993) (reviewing DAVID OSBORNE AND TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING
GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(1992) and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1993)).
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See GAO 2003, supra note 52, at 42 (OIRA commonly said that it returned rules
because the agency had not selected the alternative “that would produce the greatest net
benefits” or because of concerns about the agency’s analytical approach).
310
See HORST SIEBERT, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY AND POLICY 65
(5th Rev. ed. 1998) (maximum net benefit is reached when marginal abatement costs are
set equal to benefits defined as marginal avoided damages); ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note
308, at 18 (“net benefits are maximized. . . where marginal costs equal marginal benefits.”).
See also MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 50, 61 (suggesting an optimality concept of net
benefits by equating looking at more stringent options where costs would begin to
outweigh benefits with maximizing net benefits). Cf. Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr,
The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 140, 223-226 (1999) (suggesting
that efficiency land allocation involves setting the marginal benefit of one land use equal
to the marginal benefit of a competing land use).
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Less obviously, benefits exceeding cost (on average or at the margin) involves
an efficiency problem as well.311 Economic theory teaches that the economy
performs inefficiently when processes impose environmental damages. The damages,
or costs, are not taken into account in making production decisions and therefore
remain external to the market.312 Hence, these processes can generate costs
(environmental damages) in excess of benefits. Environmental regulation should cure
this problem, thereby improving the efficiency of the economy.
If an agency passes a regulation, but foregoes a potentially available
increment in environmental protection, it leaves some pollution unpriced and external
to the market, thereby interfering with efficiency.313 This might be justified when the
cost of making the incremental improvement exceeds the incremental value of the
benefit, at least according to economic theory.314 But where the cost of realizing an
additional incremental reduction is less than the incremental benefit, making that
additional reduction will improve efficiency. Hence, one might say that making all of
the reduction that are available without having costs exceed benefits maximizes the
net benefits of regulation, by getting as much benefit as possible without excessive
cost. This concept of maximizing net benefits equates that criterion with textbook
optimal regulation.315
This point played a role in the debate over the particulate national ambient air
quality standard promulgated in July of 1987. Professor McGarity reports that an
OMB staffer, apparently trying honestly to maximize net benefits in the textbook
sense, urged EPA to look at more stringent option than those proposed, since all of
the proposed options indicated that quantifiable benefits greatly exceeded cost.316 A
conflict erupted within OMB between the “purists” - those devoted to analysis for its
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See Carlson et al., supra note 308, at 335 (maximizing net benefits may require
“more stringent” measures).
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See generally, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC OUTLAYS, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE
16-23 (1975) (discussing types of externalities).
313

Cf. Baumol & Oates, supra note 312, at 18 (optimal taxes will reduce smoke, but
not eliminate this externality).
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See Baumol & Oates, supra note 312, at 136 (after reducing “smoke” damage to
twenty cents per unit of output through installation of pollution control devices, a charge
of fifty cents per unit of output would not be optimal).
315

See SIEBERT, supra note 310, at 46-48, 65 (equating maximum net benefit with
optimal pollution levels).
316

See MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 48, 50, 61.
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own sake - and the “realists” - those more interested in deregulation.317 The realists
prevailed and EPA promulgated its proposed option with seriously examining more
stringent alternatives than those already on the table.318
The foregoing discussion shows that CBA is generally not neutral. The forms
of it most widely touted by regulatory reformers and used or proposed in practice
benefit polluters by slowing down regulation and systematically reducing its
stringency (where it has any predictable bite at all). On the other hand, a reason for
academics to view CBA emerges as neutral does emerge from this discussion. The
Optimality Criterion, which has played only a minor role in the regulatory reform
literature and in practice, but looms large in economic theory, appears neutral in the
sense of having some theoretical potential to increase a regulation’s stringency.319
But even the neglected Optimality Criterion is not generally neutral in effect, nor is it
value neutral.
C. Methodological Bias and the View of CBA as an Objective Value Neutral
Technique
In the past, opponents of CBA have claimed that the value choices made in
choosing methodologies to quantify benefits are anti-environmental.320 CBA’s

317

ID. at 61.
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See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 63, at 16-19 (defending CBA as “maximizing net
benefits” as defined by the optimality criterion). The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1996
makes some use of an optimality criterion, but uses it as basically a one-way ratchet. If the
benefits of the maximum feasible limit would not justify the cost, EPA may promulgate a
“maximum contaminant level” (MCL) that “maximizes health risk reduction at a cost that
is justified by the benefits.” 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6). This approach does not use CBA
to justify going beyond feasible limits. Instead, it uses it to constrain the agency from
achieving feasible reductions when the benefits do not justify the costs. This might be
interpreted as limiting feasible reductions when costs exceed benefits, i.e. as an instance
of the No Excess Cost Rule. While this language uses CBA as a restraint on stringency
and not as a creator of additional stringency, it avoids the excesses of OMB’s approach to
maximizing net benefits under the Executive Order (assuming that it is implemented
properly in spite of OMB). It uses the optimality criterion to limit the damage that costbenefit considerations might inflict upon drinking water through the directive to maximize
risk reduction within a cost-benefit framework. This directive might permit the agency to
forego costs that exceed the benefits, but would not justify “maximizing net benefits” by
making further reductions in stringency beyond those suggested by an optimality criterion.

320

See also Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVT’L
L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 10064, 10069 (2004) (OMB advises agencies to disqualify scientists
who do government supported research, but not industry supported research).
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friends have responded by defending various cost-benefit methodologies.321 Even
though other literature makes extended discussion of methodological issues
unnecessary in this article,322 the basic implications of this debate for the issue of
whether CBA can be neutral are important to this article’s goal of exploring the
neutrality issue.
Most importantly for this article’s purposes, CBA’s opponents are surely
correct that choices of methodologies inherently involve value choices.323 Such
choices cannot be neutral in the sense of value free. Since CBA requires
methodologies, it cannot be neutral.
By far, the most important value choice involves the question of whether to
use a willingness to pay approach or a willingness to accept approach to valuing
health and environmental benefits.324 A willingness to pay approach estimates the
monetary value of an environmental benefits by seeking to figure out how much a
potential victim of a hazard is willing to pay to avoid a health and environmental
harm. By contrast, a willingness to accept approach values environmental benefits by
asking how much the perpetrator of a hazard would have to pay a victim to accept a
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See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 247, at 1026-1027, 1038-39; Cass R. Sunstein, Lives,
Life-Years and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (2004); Mathew D. Adler and
Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1116-1124 (2000) (defending agency deviation from “textbook
CBA”).
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See, e.g. Sunstein, supra note 321; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 4.
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health or environmental harm. The literature recognizes that willingness to pay
measures provide much lower valuations than willingness to accept measures.325
Regulators have consistently employed a willingness to pay approach, thereby
producing much lower benefits estimates than a willingness to accept approach would
generate.326
Furthermore, economists have generally employed information assumptions
that have a huge influence upon the monetization of benefits. Economists seeking to
value environmental benefits have not asked how much a polluter must pay a victim
of a health hazard to accept a harm. For example, CBA proponents do not ask how
much would a company have to pay a victim to get her to agree to die of cancer
contracted after breathing in the fumes from the company’s plant. Rather, they have
asked how much would a potential victim would pay the factory to avoid a risk. This
choice to abandon a strong perfect information assumption (that the victims of
hazards know who they are) also leads to strikingly lower benefits valuations than an
approach that employs a variant of neoclassical economics perfect information
assumption. This choice of a willingness-to-pay approach based on imperfect
information involves an important pro-industry and anti-environmental value
choice.327 It also is strikingly at odds with economic theory, which posits that market
exchange is efficient only under conditions of perfect information. Indeed, a
philosophically strong case for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency would seem to require an
extreme version of a perfect information assumption, since there is no reason to think
that people’s voluntary decisions about exchange prove efficient if they do not fully
understand the consequences of their decisions.328
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See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 148-49.
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See id. 10964-65.
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The choice of a discount rate also has an enormous effect upon the
calculations of benefits.329 But this choice amounts to “a value judgment about equity
between generations.”330
Also, writers frequently point out that CBA is anti-environmental, because it
gives short shrift to soft variables.331 The cases examined in preparing this paper
strongly support this point. First of all, in the vast majority of cases, the agency was
unable to quantify any of the benefits, for perfectly good reasons. This failure often
led to OMB opposition to the rule.
In every case where the agency quantified some benefits, it quantified direct
costs, but listed large categories of significant direct environmental benefits that it
could not quantify and monetize. While in the abstract OMB recognizes that CBA
“can . . . be misleading” when important benefits cannot be quantified and
monetized,332 OMB often opposes regulation when monetized costs outweighed
monetized benefits (as well as in many cases where monetized benefits exceeded
monetized costs). This provides powerful evidence that CBA leads to decisions
giving unquantifiable benefits no weight, as its critics have feared. It also means that
monetization cannot provide objective guidance to decisions about which regulations
to reject, for a responsible regulator figuring out how to respond to CBA always must
decide whether the non-quantified benefits justify more stringent regulation. Thus,
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discounting’s moral issues in the climate change context); Heinzerling, supra note 323;
Revesz, supra note 323; Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267
(1993). See also Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and
Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 495 (1984).
331

See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 121, 149 (2001) (CBA “tends to underrate those things that cannot be
quantified and monetized.”); MCGARITY, supra note 1, at 134; Laurence H. Tribe, Ways
Not to Think About Plastic Trees, 83 YALE L. J. 1315, 1318-19 & n. 25 (1974) (quantitative
analysis may squeeze out “soft” but critical information); Laurence H. Tribe, Policy,
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972).
332

OMB, supra note 210, at 127.

February 28, 2005

NEUTRAL CBA

69

CBA cannot be neutral because of the limits of monetization and the impossibility of
any neutral monetization methods.333
D. Procedural Neutrality
The beginning of this article suggested that a concept of procedural neutrality
might justify CBA. CBA could be conceived of as neutral in the sense that a fair
hearing is neutral, a mandate for CBA effectively directs agencies to listen to both
sides, considering the costs and benefits.
The idea of a criterion to govern administrative decisions, however, casts
doubt on whether the fair hearing concept of procedural neutrality justifies a choice
of a cost-benefit criterion over the alternatives. No matter what the legal criteria
governing a decision, the decision-maker can listen to both sides. For example, if the
feasibility principle governs a rulemaking, agencies can listen to industry claims that
a requirement is so expensive that it would put it out of business and to
environmentalist claims that a stricter requirement could be imposed without putting
anyone out of business. Even a clearly one-sided criterion allows both sides to be
heard; it just changes the nature of what they need to say. For example, when
Congress decided that national ambient air quality standards should protect the public
health with an adequate margin of safety,334 a criterion that excludes cost
considerations altogether, it still required EPA to listen to and respond to industry
comments.335 But this criterion means that effective industry advocates will argue
that strict levels of control are not needed to protect public health, thereby focusing
the argument on health data, rather than cost. Any legal criterion makes some
arguments more important than others, making some considerations central and
others irrelevant.
A cost-benefit criterion may appear to require the agencies to listen to a wider
variety of arguments than alternative criteria. But such a criterion does cut off some
of what environmentalists would like to say. For example, a cost-benefit criterion
makes an argument that a particular level of environmental improvement is needed to
protect public health irrelevant. And it makes it much harder to argue for precaution
and attention to non-quantifiable harms.
The indeterminate position (that CBA should be considered), however, could
be taken as opening up the conversation to all possible considerations and points of
view. But this is not because CBA is a more neutral procedure. The procedure can
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be the same under all of the approaches discussed so far, a duty for the agency to
consider written comments usually coupled with the availability of a judicial hearing
for the disgruntled. The indeterminate position involves a commitment to infinite
agency discretion unguided by a legislative policy choice.336
This proposal for infinite agency discretion might be conceived of as a form
of neutrality - openness to all arguments with no pre-existing legal criteria. If so, it is
a type of neutrality going beyond that normally offered by courts, which usually
listen to both sides to determine who wins under a policy decision made in prior
judicial decisions, in adopting a constitution, or in writing a statute. And this form of
“neutrality” involves a commitment to allowing administrative agencies, rather than
elected officials assembled in Congress, to make all of the crucial value decisions
inherent in policy-making.337 A subsequent Article will examine the question of
whether this sort of neutrality is desirable. For present purposes, it suffices to note
that CBA’s tendency to shape debate limits its capacity to act as a neutral procedure.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGULATORY REFORM DEBATE
The debate about the future of government standard setting should address
value choices and the nature of the society we live in.338 Unfortunately, CBA has not
had a neutral effect. It has thwarted environmental protection completely when
embodied in a cost-benefit test and weakened it substantially when introduced as an
important consideration. In principle, the most frequently used and advocated
versions of cost-benefit tests favor regulated firms and never favor additional
protection of safety, health, and the environment.
This finding that CBA is generally anti-environmental will not end the debate
about CBA’s value. It should, however, lead to some rethinking of the debate.
Advocates of CBA as a neutral rationalizing reform should oppose tests, like
the test that costs should not exceed benefits, that operate in theory as a one-way
ratchet, only reducing stringency and never increasing it. Such a test does not solve
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the problem they claim that regulation poses, overly stringent regulation in some
cases and too little regulation in others.339 It simply reduces the stringency of some
regulation.
Those who view CBA as advancing “overall well being”340 or optimality,
however, can still argue that either an optimality test or the indeterminate position
might advance their goals. The empirical data presented, though, casts doubt on the
idea that CBA leads to better regulation. The case studies show that in practice OMB
often rejects regulation that passes a cost-benefit test. Also, OMB often favored less
stringent regulation even when no CBA had been performed to justify a conclusion
that it was sub-optimal. Finally, OMB never used evidence that a regulation was
insufficiently stringent to meet an optimality criterion to urge more stringent
regulation than the agency had proposed. These findings suggest that CBA does not
subject regulation to an optimality test, but instead provides an ideological
justification for very free-ranging opposition to environmental, health, and safety
standards.
The lead case, of course, may cause some to conclude that the problem lies
with OMB, rather than CBA. After all, when OMB was not involved, EPA did find
CBA helpful in recognizing an opportunity for continuing its phase-down of lead
from small refineries. This might suggest that we should abolish the OMB, but
continue with administrative agency CBA. A more modest suggestion would involve
confining OMB review to economically significant rules, those costing $100 million
a year or more. The data presented here suggest that OMB acts as a general drag on
government standard setting even when little is at stake economically.341
But the data suggest some problems with the conclusion that agencies should
conduct CBA, even freed (completely or partially) from OMB oversight. First, the
early history of the lead case suggests that cost-benefit tests can foil the most valuable
regulation, regulation that responds to serious health problems before the damage to
people provides sufficient data to quantify the problem’s magnitude. Second, the
data suggests that the widely recognized problem of unquantifiable benefits is
pervasive. In most cases, the agency could not quantify any of the rule’s benefits, for
understandable reasons that did not call into question the existence of substantial
benefits. Every completed CBA listed many of the proposal’s potential benefits,
often the most important benefits the rule offered, as non-quantifiable. Thoughtful
CBA advocates favor considering non-quantified benefits, but have not explained
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how agencies can integrate them into a cost-benefit framework.342 Third, if the only
case where CBA favored additional regulation involves a situation where the
economic benefits were positive, perhaps we should just conduct studies of economic
costs and benefits, and spare regulators the difficulty of seeking to quantify and
monetize environmental and health effects.
Ronnie Levin, the author of the case study on lead in drinking water, explains
that usually the inability to quantify important benefits constrains CBA’s utility.343
When monetized benefits are less than monetized costs, she notes, one cannot draw
conclusions about whether or not total net benefits are positive.344 For one cannot tell
whether the unmonetized benefits would tip the balance in the regulation’s favor.
Under these circumstances, a conclusion that the monetized costs outweigh the
environmental benefits cannot objectively justify weakening a regulation.
On the other hand, when the monetized benefits outweigh the cost, one can
tell that the regulation offers positive net benefits. But one cannot tell how much
stricter the regulation needs to be to meet an optimality criteria, because one cannot
determine the magnitude of unquantifiable benefits.
The economist Robert Hahn’s statement that most regulation could not pass
“an objective economists’ cost-benefit test”345 articulates a central tenet of regulatory
reformers. While the statement appears utterly damning, it is profoundly misleading.
First, in the face of any environmental regulation with significant non-quantified
benefits an objective economist would concede that he did not know whether or not
the regulation passed a cost-benefit test. Second, there is no such thing as an
objective cost-benefit test. A cost-benefit test embodies the value judgments made,
explicitly or implicitly, in constructing its methodology. The central lesson here is
that responsible scholars cannot reach conclusions about the success or failures of
regulations without explicitly taking available data about unquantified benefits into
account.
Of course, some may view agencies as so radically prone toward stringent
regulation that a one-way ratchet is a good idea. But legal scholars supporting CBA
have not made this argument. Instead, they have argued that regulation sometimes
needs to be stricter. It seems unlikely that a system that only constrains
environmental regulation and almost never increases its scope and stringency would
improve society’s well being.
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CONCLUSION
The lawyers representing environmental organizations and regulated firms got
it right. CBA is not neutral in practice and is, in many ways, anti-environmental in
theory. That finding cannot end the debate about regulatory reform. But the
argument that CBA is a neutral rationalizing reform that all should favor as a
“pragmatic” measure ignores most of the relevant theory and most of the relevant
history. That sort of argument should be laid to rest.
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Appendix
Rules in Which OMB Sought Significant Changes During
Formal Reviews Between June of 2001 and July of 2002
Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Indemnity Payment (Department of
Agriculture)
Foot and Mouth Disease: Indemnity Payments (Depart of Agriculture)
Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration)346
Control of Emissions of Nonroad Large Spark-Ignition Engines and Recreational
Engines (EPA)
Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New Marine Compression Ignition
Engines
at or Above 30 liters/Cylinder (EPA)
Control of Emissions from Spark Ignition Marine Vessels and Highway Motorcycles
(EPA)
Consolidated Emissions Reporting Rule (EPA)
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Surface Coating for
Wood Building Products (EPA)
Compliance Program Fees for Light-Duty Vehicles & Engines; Heavy Duty Vehicles
& Engine; & Nonroad Engines & Motorcycles (EPA)
Proposed Nonperformance Penalties for 2004 and Later Model Year Emission
Standards for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines & Heavy Duty Vehicles (EPA)
Identification & Listing of Hazardous Waste; Addition of Manganese to Appendix
VIII; Inorganic Chem. Man. Waste; & CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designations
& Reportable Quantities (EPA)

346

This rule was subject to two formal reviews during this period. The twenty-five
cases involve 25 reviews. See GAO, supra note 52, at 69 n. 1 (explaining that the GAO
uses the term “rules” to refer to submissions under the executive orders and that OMB
reviewed some rules more than once).
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Minimizing Adverse Environmental Impact from Cooling Water Intake Structures at
New Facilities Under Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, Phase I (EPA)
National Point Discharge Effluent Standards: Proposed Regulations to Establish
Requirements for Large Cooling Water Intake Structure at Existing Power Generating
Facilities (EPA)
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Long-Term Enhanced Surface
Treatment Rule (EPA)
Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Fill Material" and
Discharge of Fill Material" [The Mountaintop Mining Rule] (EPA)
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the
Construction and Development Category (EPA)
Effluent Limitation Guidelines , Pretreatment Standards, and NSPS for the Iron &
Steel Man. Point Source Category (EPA)
Part 145 Review: Repair Stations (EPA)
Certification of Pilots, Aircraft and Repairmen for the Operation of Light Sport
Aircraft (EPA)
Corrosion Control Plan (EPA)
Aging Airplane Safety (EPA)
Revision of Digital Flight Data Recorder Regulations for Boeing 737 Airplanes for
Part 125 Operations (EPA)
Federal Water Quality Standards for Indian Country and Other Provisions Regarding
Federal Water Quality Standards (EPA)
Part 145 Review: Repair Stations (FAA)

